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Minimizing Error and Bias in Death Investigations† 
Dan Simon 
 
One of the prominent developments in the forensic sciences is the 
emergence of attention to cognitive aspects of forensic examination.  Notable 
in this regard is the recognition that forensic results can be swayed by the 
examiner’s exposure to non-scientific background information that should 
arguably have no bearing on the result.  To counter these effects, forensic 
agencies have introduced context management procedures, which are 
designed to withhold background information from the examiner during 
critical parts of the examination.  Context management procedures are well-
suited for some forensic disciplines but apply less obviously to disciplines 
that entail complex, sprawling, iterative, and open-ended reasoning 
processes.  Notably, the procedures have been met with stern resistance from 
the field of death investigation.  This Article sets out to explore whether and 
how context management can and should be implemented to the practice of 
death investigation. 
As currently practiced, the death investigation environment is replete 
with background information that renders investigative conclusions 
susceptible to influences borne by non-medical information of unknown 
reliability.  Such effects can occur through two routes: either by way of 
unconscious biasing of the investigation (the context bias) or through the 
conscious and deliberate incorporation of that information.  Both effects 
could be mitigated by means of context management procedures.  To 
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complicate matters, however, background information also plays an 
important facilitative role in death examinations by way of enabling the 
generation of investigative hypothesis without which the process is unlikely 
to succeed.  These conflicting effects of background information make it 
difficult to determine ex ante which information should be shared with the 
investigator and which should be masked.  The Article proposes a nuanced 
three-part cost-benefit analysis, but finds that it produces only a series of 
murky judgments that result in a conundrum that defies a simple or uniform 
solution. 
The Article seeks a way out of this conundrum.  The framework 
proposes that cases referred to death examiner offices be triaged to identify 
the small category of ambiguous criminal cases, and that only those cases 
should be subjected to context management.  Within that category of cases, 
death examiners should be free to receive the types of background 
information that tend to be within or proximate to their expertise, but not be 
exposed to types that fall outside of that range.  The proposed framework is 
admittedly imperfect, but given the intractability of the topic, any step 
forward should be welcomed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I would first like to express my sense of honor for being included in 
this venerable symposium dedicated to the lifelong contributions of D. 
Michael Risinger.  I am thankful for the opportunity to celebrate and laude 
Michael for being a daunting scholar, a generous mentor, a piercing critic, a 
model public citizen, and a warrior for justice.  I am also thankful to Michael 
for planting the seeds that spurted this Article. 
This Article sets out to examine possible pitfalls within the practice of 
death investigation.  Specifically, it seeks to explore whether and how death 
investigations might be skewed by exposure to background information 
about the decedent or the circumstances of the death, and what, if anything, 
can and should be done about that.  As will soon be seen, these questions 
entail a rather complex array of normative, legal, cognitive, and practical 
dimensions.  Over and above the scholarly dimensions of this inquiry, the 
Article is animated by a desire to play a constructive role in the ongoing 
conversation devoted to this issue within the field of forensic science, in 
particular between the death examiners community and the human factors 
community.1  The Article’s ultimate aim is to advance this conversation by 
suggesting justifiable, feasible and minimally intrusive procedures to 
maximize the accuracy of death investigations in the acute category of 
ambiguous investigations destined to be used in criminal proceedings. 
The 2009 report composed by the National Research Council, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward2 
(“NRC Report” or “Report”), shook the forensic world to the core.  The blue 
ribbon Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences 
Community,  which authored the Report, observed what critics had already 
known: imprecise, exaggerated, and outright invalid forensic work had been 
used with some regularity in criminal investigations, prosecutions, and 
 
 1  Both communities participate actively in OSAC, currently operating under the NIST.  
The mandate of the Medicolegal Death Investigation Subcommittee is to “focu[s] on 
standards and guidelines related to sudden, unnatural, unexplained or suspicious deaths, 
including homicides, suicides, unintentional fatal injuries, drug-related deaths and other 
deaths that are sudden or unexpected; determination of the cause and manner of death.”  See 
Forensic Science: Medicolegal Death Investigation Subcommittee, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/medicolegal-death-
investigation-subcommittee (last updated Oct. 2, 2018).  The mandate of the Human Factors 
Committee is to “provide[] guidance throughout the OSAC on the influence of systems design 
on human performance and on ways to mitigate errors in complex tasks.”  See Forensic 
Science: Human Factors Committee, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/human-factors-committee (last updated May 
21, 2018). 
 2  COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 1 
(Nat’l Acads. Press 2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter 
NRC REPORT]. 
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criminal proceedings, leading at times to faulty outcomes.  The Report noted 
the wide variability in the scientific soundness of various fields of forensic 
science, as well as the uneven and often inadequate oversight, staffing, 
certification, and accreditation of forensic agencies. 
The Report’s sweeping recommendations laid the foundation and 
provided the impetus for the array of efforts currently underway to reform 
and transform the forensic sciences.  The Report broke new ground by 
acknowledging outright that “forensic science experts are vulnerable to 
cognitive and contextual bias.”3  The Report drew attention to a slew of 
potential cognitive pitfalls that could impact forensic results in tasks that 
involve subjective judgment, including the dangers of overconfidence, 
ignoring base rates, suggestive and leading framing, confirmation bias, 
escalation of commitment, and overreliance on intuitive judgment.4  The 
Report laid the ground for the emergence of the field of human factors as an 
integral component in the transformation of the forensic sciences.  A Human 
Factors Subcommittee was established under the Department of Justice’s 
National Commission on Forensic Science,5 and a Human Factors 
Committee serves as one of the three resource committees of the 
Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) for Forensic Science, 
currently operating under the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).6 
The Report clarified that these cognitive biases “are not the result of 
character flaws; instead, they are common features of decision making, and 
they cannot be willed away.”7  Indeed, one of the recommendations was to 
urge the development of “standard operating procedures . . . to minimize, to 
the greatest extent reasonably possible, potential bias and sources of human 
error in forensic practice.”8  In particular, the NRC Report cited the 
groundbreaking research by Michael Risinger and colleagues9 that 
highlighted the disruptive potential of exposing forensic analysts to certain 
types of investigative information, a phenomenon known as context bias.10  
As a general rule, the human factors community follows the adage that it is 
 
 3  Id. at 8 n.8. 
 4  Id. at 122–24.   
 5  See Human Factors, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES, 
https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/human-factors (last updated Nov. 6, 2017).  
 6  See Forensic Science: Human Factors Committee, supra note 1.  
 7  NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 122. 
 8  Id. at 24. 
 9  See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. 
Rev. 1 (2002); Michael J. Saks et al., Context Effects in Forensic Science: A Review and 
Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory Practice in the United States, 43 
SCI. & JUST. 77 (2003) [hereinafter Saks et al., Context Effects in Forensic Science]. 
 10  See NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 n.8. 
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more effective to control the situation than to debias the person.11  That 
usually boils down to structuring the decision environment and flow of 
information in ways that are expected to minimize the risk of biased 
decisions.  The most widespread mechanism used to address the risk of bias 
is directed towards restricting forensic examiners’ exposure to information 
that is considered “task-irrelevant,”12 an approach known as “context 
management.” 
Context management is often implemented by means of a “case 
manager model,” which is designed to separate forensic functions between 
analysts and case managers.  Case managers are exposed to the full picture 
of the case, which enables them to communicate effectively with other 
investigators, participate in decisions about the collection of specimens from 
the crime scene, decide which examinations should be performed, and 
manage the flow of work and information in the laboratory.  Specifically, 
case managers assign the tasks to the analysts and provide them with the 
specimens to be tested accompanied only by information that is strictly 
needed for the performance of that task.  This functional separation allows 
case managers to manage and steer the forensic examination required in the 
case, while keeping analysts blind—at least during critical phases of the 
investigation—to extraneous investigative facts that are unnecessary for the 
analyses they are assigned to perform.13  This approach has spawned the 
Linear Sequential Unmasking model, which guides the masking and 
unmasking of task-irrelevant background information over the course of 
process.  According to this regimen, examiners are expected to perform their 
first testing or analysis prior to being exposed to the background information.  
At that time, they should document and explain their conclusion alongside a 
statement of confidence in it.  Subsequent to that phase, the case manager 
can release the withheld information to the examiner.  The examiner can then 
reexamine the evidence, and if needed, revise or change the conclusion, 
accompanied by a documented explanation of the reason for change.14  
 
 11  Jack B. Soll et al., A User’s Guide to Debiasing, in 2 THE WILEY BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 924 (Gideon Keren & George Wu eds., 2015). 
 12  On the concept of task-relevance, see infra Part II.C.  
 13  See Reinoud D. Stoel et al., Minimizing Contextual Bias in Forensic Casework, in 
FORENSIC SCIENCE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 
67 (Kevin J. Strom & Matthew J. Hickman eds., 2015); WILLIAM THOMPSON ET AL., AM. 
ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., FORENSIC SCIENCE ASSESSMENTS: A QUALITY AND GAP 
ANALYSIS, LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION 13 (2017), https://www.aaas.org/report/latent-
fingerprint-examination; Bryan Found & John Ganas, The Management of Domain Irrelevant 
Context Information in Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework, 53 SCI. & JUST. 154, 
156 (2013).   
 14  See Itiel E. Dror et al., Letter to the Editor—Context Management Toolbox: A Linear 
Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for Minimizing Cognitive Bias in Forensic Decision 
Making, 60 J. OF FORENSIC SCI. 1111 (2015) [hereinafter Dror et al., Letter to the Editor]. 
SIMON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2018  2:12 PM 
260 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:255 
Procedures designed to blind forensic examiners are routinely followed in 
the field of scientific experimentation.  Indeed, one of the key features of 
scientific methodology is to manage the context, specifically, by way of 
insulating the scientists and preventing their hypotheses, goals, and 
expectations from affecting the data collection, measurement, and 
interpretation.15 
In all, content management has become a mainstay in attempts to 
reform the forensic sciences.  Linear sequential unmasking procedures have 
been implemented by prestigious forensic agencies including the FBI,16 and 
the Netherlands Forensic Institute.17  The National Research Council’s call 
for context management has been adopted by prominent forensic regulatory 
and scientific bodies, including the Forensic Science Regulator in the United 
Kingdom,18 the National Commission on Forensic Science in the United 
States,19 and the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology.20  The importance of curbing the impact of context bias in the 
forensic sciences has also been echoed by the broader scientific community, 
as manifested by coverage in major scientific journals such as Science21 and 
Nature.22 
In short, context management procedures have become a centerpiece of 
the human factors contribution to the practice of forensic science, 
particularly in the disciplines that go under the general rubric of pattern 
comparison, such as fingerprints, ballistics, tools marks, tires, fibers, and 
even DNA analysis.  But not all forensic disciplines and not all forensic tasks 
are born equal, and the rationales that apply to one forensic field might not 
 
 15  See LARRY B. CHRISTENSEN, BURKE R. JOHNSON & LISA A. TURNER, RESEARCH 
METHODS, DESIGN, AND ANALYSIS (12th ed. 2014); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, 
The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 847, 893 (2005). 
 16  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S 
PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 
1 (2011),  https://oig.justice.gov/special/s1105.pdf. 
 17  Stoel et al., supra note 13, at 79. 
 18  See FORENSIC SCI. REGULATOR, GUIDANCE: COGNITIVE BIAS EFFECTS RELEVANT TO 
FORENSIC SCIENCE EXAMINATIONS  67–69 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
publications/cognitive-bias-effects-relevant-to-forensic-science-examinations. 
 19  NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIEWS OF THE COMMISSION: 
ENSURING THAT FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION 1–2 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/818196/ download. 
 20  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT—FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC 
VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 10 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives. 
gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ orensic_science_report_final.pdf. 
 21  Kelly Servick, Forensic Labs Explore Blind Testing to Prevent Errors, 349 SCI. 456, 
462 (2015). 
 22  Laura Spinney, Science in Court: The Fine Print, 464 NATURE 325, 344 (2010).   
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apply straightforwardly to tasks practiced in other forensic disciplines.23  
Indeed, while context management techniques are well-suited for bench 
examinations, they may not be suitable in forensic disciplines practiced in 
field settings, which entail dynamic and open-ended investigative processes 
that often involve close interaction with other investigative branches.  
Topmost in this category is the field of death investigation.24 
The proposed application of context management to death investigation 
has been met with stern resistance from the forensic pathology community.  
This position was articulated in an article co-authored by William Oliver and 
three leading figures in the field.25  The thrust of the argument rests on the 
objection to a blanket importation of context management procedures from 
pattern comparison fields to the death investigation domain.26  The objection 
hinges on four major claims.  First, the authors argue, context management 
will hinder medical examiners’ ability to reach correct conclusions.27  
Second, context management will be unworkable and will hamstring 
investigations.28  Third, context management fails to address a host of issues 
that trouble and burden the field of forensic pathology, such as honest 
scientific disagreement, lack of uniform training and uneven professional 
competence, occasional unethical behavior, and political and institutional 
pressure.29  Finally, Oliver and colleagues have pushed back against the 
proposition that cognitive bias might influence forensic conclusions in the 
domain of death investigation.30 
 
 
 23  As noted by Itiel Dror, for any type of task, a particular cognitive treatment could be 
deemed insufficient, well-calibrated, or overkill.  See Itiel E. Dror, Practical Solutions to 
Cognitive and Human Factor Challenges in Forensic Science, 4 FORENSIC SCI. POL’Y & 
MGMT. 105, 110 (2013). 
 24  Arguably, this category could also include fire investigation and crime scene 
investigation.   
 25  William R. Oliver et al., Cognitive Bias in Medicolegal Death Investigation, 5 ACAD. 
FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 548 (2015). 
 26  See id. at 549.  This point was made also in a recent review that concludes: “Our 
current clinical diagnostic process has both merits and inadequacies; however, it is not readily 
amenable to debiasing by the blinding process.”  Joseph J. Lockhart & Saty Satya-Murti, 
Diagnosing Crime and Diagnosing Disease: Bias Reduction Strategies in the Forensic and 
Clinical Sciences, 62 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1534, 1537 (2017). 
 27  Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 549–53. 
 28  Id. at 557–59. 
 29  Id. at 554–57. 
 30  The authors argue 
[t]here is no scientific study that demonstrates that “cognitive bias” is a 
severe or driving problem in medicolegal death investigation. It is not 
enough to show that ‘cognitive bias’ (however broadly and poorly 
defined) exists in some experimental situation. It needs to be shown that 
it is an actual and significant problem in practice.  
Id. at 556. 
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This Article takes seriously the first critique regarding the impact of 
context management on the accuracy of death investigations.  Indeed, this 
point will be addressed throughout this Article.  The Article will also address 
the second objection regarding the burden entailed by context management 
procedures.31  The third objection seems tangential to the issue at hand.  
Context management should not be perceived as purporting to solve every 
problem that weighs down on the field of forensic pathology.  As such, this 
objection will not be discussed any further.  Finally, the proposition that 
death examiners are not susceptible to cognitive bias is an untenable 
empirical proposition, and the notion that the prospect of bias cannot be 
posited absent research performed in this particular field is unsustainable.32  
Still, this Article suggests that the justification for introducing context 
management to the field of death investigation does not hinge on the prospect 
of cognitive bias.  Context management in this field is better justified as a 
measure to counter the explicit policy of incorporating certain types of non-
medical background information in the investigative reasoning process.33 
The Article will proceed as follows.  Part II will present a brief 
overview of the forensic field of death investigation and highlight some of 
the characteristics that bear on its investigative conclusions.  Importantly, as 
currently practiced, background information—of both medical and non-
medical nature—often plays an instrumental role in reaching death 
investigative conclusions.  To assess the possible impact of this information 
on the process, the Article offers a typology of background information that 
varies according to its proximity to the forensic pathologists’ expertise, its 
reliability and diagnosticity.  This four-way typology—which includes 
medical history, death scene findings, social history, and information from 
the police investigation—will figure prominently in the proposed solution 
delineated in Part V.  Part II seeks also to expand the prevailing conversation 
beyond the view that exposure to background information necessarily 
influences investigations by way of the context bias, that is, by means of 
unconscious and non-normative reasoning.  Investigative conclusions can 
also be skewed through a different cognitive route, namely, via the conscious 
and deliberate incorporation of information that is of unknown reliability and 
questionable diagnosticity.  Fortunately, both routes can be treated through 
the same mechanism of context management.  This Part will also introduce 
the concept of task-relevance, which, in most forensic domains, serves as the 
reliable touchstone for distinguishing between information that should be 
masked and information that should be shared without restriction.  Though, 
it must be acknowledged that in other domains—such as forensic 
 
 31  See discussion of feasibility infra notes 147–150 and accompanying text. 
 32  See infra notes 178–189 and accompanying text.   
 33  See discussion infra note 82–85 and accompanying text. 
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pathology—the determination of task-relevance ex ante can be elusive or 
indeterminable.  In the absence of a clear task-relevance determination, the 
introduction of context management will inevitably require a careful analysis 
of the competing risks and advantages that it will likely bear on the 
investigative task.  In this vein, the Article proposes a cost-benefit 
framework for evaluating the appropriateness of introducing context 
management procedures.  The three-part calculus focuses on the likely effect 
on the accuracy of investigations (an evaluation that hinges on the net 
balance between the anticipated reduction in error and the loss of accurate 
and diagnostic information), the likely effect on investigative efficacy (the 
risk that the intervention will result in a higher rate of incomplete or 
inconclusive outcomes), and on feasibility and logistical burdens entailed by 
the intervention. 
Part III provides a review of the cognitive processes involved in 
conducting death investigations.  The proposition is that death 
investigations—not unlike diagnostic medical decision making and most 
other investigative endeavors—are performed by means of a model known 
as abductive reasoning.  Abductive reasoning is not a singular or well-
defined cognitive task, but a framework that consists of multiple reasoning 
processes that serve three core functions: generating hypotheses, testing 
those hypotheses, and evaluating the surviving hypotheses to arrive at the 
best explanation.  The model of abductive reasoning will set us up for 
examining how the unintended impact of context management could 
adversely affect the death investigation process. 
Part IV sets out to apply the cost-benefit analysis to the death 
investigation task, only to reveal an intricate web of conflicting, 
unquantifiable, and incommensurable considerations.  First, it seems clear 
that masking background information is bound to increase the accuracy of 
the process by way of reducing the ill-effects that might be harbored by that 
information.  That, of course, is the policy’s core justification.  But at the 
same time, the measure might also deprive the death examiner of information 
that could be factually correct and diagnostic of the circumstances of the 
death.  Second, masking background information runs the serious risk of 
depriving the death examiner of background information that could be 
instrumental for the generation of hypotheses.  By undermining this crucial 
building block of abductive reasoning, context management could result in 
incomplete or inconclusive investigations.  Third, adding a sequential 
information-masking process will naturally require additional personnel 
involvement, and will likely entail difficulties with timing and coordination.  
Notably, a blanket policy of context management would impose a 
disproportionate burden on the profession by imposing those costs on the 
entire breadth of death investigations in the vein of addressing the most acute 
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cases, which make up a minority of the overall portfolio.  Evaluating and 
trading off these countervailing forces would require a nuanced and informed 
judgment of the frequency, weighting, probativeness, and practical 
implications of each piece of background information in the particular case 
at hand, an elusive judgment that might require obtaining even more 
background information.  In sum, we are left facing a virtually intractable 
and incommensurable conundrum that defies a simple or uniform solution. 
Part V offers an attempt to find a way out of this conundrum.  In that 
vein, the Article offers a framework that is founded on two intersecting 
dimensions.  First, the framework is premised on the notion that the most 
acute category of cases consists of those headed for criminal proceedings, in 
which the costs of investigative errors are particularly high and the prospect 
of incomplete or inclusive investigations is more tolerated, and in which the 
investigative task is non-obvious.  The framework also assumes that the risk 
of error is weakest in obvious cases that present the death examiner with only 
minimal ambiguity.  The proposed framework turns the disproportionate mix 
of cases to an advantage: context management policies will be suggested 
only for this narrow category of acute cases, which means that examiners 
would be subjected to context management rather rarely, perhaps once in 
every several months.  In the vast majority of cases, examiners would remain 
unencumbered by informational restrictions.  Second, even in that narrow 
category of acute cases, death examiners shall continue to be exposed to the 
medical history and death scene findings, but not to the less reliable types of 
information.  The proposed framework is admittedly imperfect, and one can 
easily imagine that difficult cases might be misclassified or mistreated.  But 
having a framework is arguably better than working with none.  At a 
minimum, the framework will provide stakeholders with a vehicle for 
thinking constructively about this important and perplexing topic. 
II. THE FIELD OF DEATH INVESTIGATION 
Before we delve into the specifics of the possible causes of error in the 
practice of death examination, we must gain an understanding of how this 
forensic discipline is practiced.  Medicolegal death investigations (“death 
investigations”) are led and supervised by forensic pathologists, who are also 
vested with the authority to make the certification of death.  Forensic 
pathologists are fully-trained physicians (MDs or DOs) and have undergone 
extensive education in anatomical pathology, with a subspecialization 
(fellowship training) in death investigation and the performance of 
autopsies.34  Forensic pathologists are associated under the National 
 
 34  See Garry F. Peterson & Steven C. Clark, Forensic Autopsy Performance Standards, 
27 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 200, 209, Standard B4 (2006).  For the purposes of 
this review, the terms “medical examiner” and “forensic pathologist” will be used 
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Association of Medical Examiners (NAME).35  In most medical examiner 
offices, forensic pathologists are aided by medicolegal death investigators, 
whose responsibilities include investigation of the death scene and collection 
of most of the background information that will be used in the 
investigation.36  Given that the core investigatory responsibility and 
discretion are vested in the hands of the forensic pathologist, this Article will 
focus on that function, unless stated otherwise. 
Medical examiners accept a death for investigation only after 
conducting a triage decision that determines their jurisdiction over it.37  
Jurisdiction is typically assumed when the death appears to have come about 
unnaturally or caused by violence, when infants and children die 
unexpectedly or inexplicably, and when people die in police custody.38  
Historically, death investigations were designed with the criminal process in 
mind, though over time death investigation has become increasingly focused 
on serving other public purposes.39  These include the bureaucratic function 
of certifying death for the issuance of death certificates, epidemiological 
research, and the production of health statistics for public health policy.  In 
their capacity as death certifiers, forensic pathologists serve effectively as 
ultimate decision makers.  They also operate as “all-source experts,” in that 
they evaluate all the evidence—of both medical and non-medical kinds—
and draw their best judgment from that evidence.40 
 
interchangeably.   
 35  See About NAME, NAT’L ASS’N OF MED. EXAMINERS, https://www.thename.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
 36  See Welcome to AMBDI, AM. BD. OF MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATORS, 
http://www.abmdi.org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). Medicolegal death investigators are 
associated through the American Board of Medicolegal Death Investigators.  Id.  For a 
discussion of the regulation of the work of medicolegal death investigators, see TECH. UPDATE 
REVIEW COMM., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, DEATH INVESTIGATION: A GUIDE FOR THE SCENE 
INVESTIGATOR (2011), http://www.abmdi.org/documents/deathinvestigation_guidelines.pdf.  
 37  See Peterson & Clark, supra note 34, at 207, Standard A2. 
 38  See id. at 208, Standard B3.  The triage decision can determine whether the body needs 
to come to the medical examiner’s office for autopsy, whether the death certificate can be 
signed without an autopsy, or whether jurisdiction can be ceded to a treating physician 
(because the death is from natural causes).  Id. 
 39  Randy Hanzlick, Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Public Health: A Review and 
Update, 130 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 1274, 1274–75 (2006).  It should 
be noted that statutory powers to conduct death investigations are vested in medical examiners 
in only a minority of jurisdictions across the United States.  See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN ET AL., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: MEDICAL 
EXAMINERS AND CORONERS’ OFFICES, 2004, 1 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
meco04.pdf.  About one half of the death investigations performed in the United States are 
conducted by coroners, who are often elected officials and typically have no medical training.  
See id. 
 40  See William C. Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert 
Opinion: What Do Experts Need to Know and When Do They Know Too Much?, in BLINDING 
AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 
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The death investigation process culminates in the death certification, 
which comprises of two separate determinations: cause of death and manner 
of death.  The cause of death determination refers to the physical antecedent 
of death, such as disease or injury.  Though for medicolegal forensic 
purposes, the ultimate physiological disturbance—such as a hemorrhagic 
shock or respiratory paralysis—is of limited value.  We are interested rather 
in the “underlying” or “primary” event that brought about that disturbance, 
such as a drowning or a gunshot wound to the head.  Determinations of 
manner of death pertain to the broader circumstances by which the death was 
brought about.  This classification requires forensic pathologists to choose 
from a list of five categories: natural, accident, homicide, suicide, and 
undetermined.  Manner of death determinations are intended to serve the 
public health function.  Thus, classifying a death as a homicide can readily 
spill into the criminal domain, and thus make a strong impact on the criminal 
process. 
The field of medicolegal investigation endures a number of hardships, 
including scientific disagreement, lack of uniform training, uneven 
professional competence, and political and institutional pressure.41  As 
described in the NRC Report, the field is characterized by “disparate and 
often inadequate educational and training requirements, resources, and 
capacities—in short, a system in need of significant improvement.”42  In 
performing their work, forensic pathologists are subjected to a range of 
adversities, including workplace stress,43 vicarious trauma brought upon by 
repeated exposure to crime scenes and distressing case details,44 exposure to 
institutional pressures from law enforcement agencies and other 
 
133, 147 (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016) [hereinafter 
Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis].   
 41  Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 555–56.  
 42  NRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 14 (citing HICKMAN ET AL., supra note 39).  
 43  See Elizabeth Brondolo et al., Work-Related Predictors of Psychological Distress 
Among Medical Examiner and Coroner Personnel, 2 ACAD. FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 80 (2012). 
 44  See Sharon Rae Jenkins & Stephanie Baird, Secondary Traumatic Stress and 
Vicarious Trauma: A Validational Study, 15 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 423 (2002), for a 
discussion of vicarious trauma. 
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stakeholders,45 a low tolerance for error,46 and budgetary constraints.47  
Forensic pathologists have contributed to a number of mistaken prosecutions 
that resulted in apparent false convictions,48 and some members of the 
profession have engaged in disturbingly unprofessional and unethical 
conduct.49  This Article, however, focuses on the specific issue of 
investigative accuracy, and pertains to the work of forensic pathologists—
undoubtedly, the vast majority of the members of the profession—who 
perform this vital social role in a most professional, dedicated, and honest 
manner. 
A. Background Information 
As mentioned, the core of this Article concerns the role and function of 
background information in the death investigation process.  The term 
background information is used to denote any information that is not derived 
 
 45  A survey of forensic pathologists reveals that over seventy percent of survey 
respondents reported that they had been subjected to pressures to influence their findings and 
that many had suffered adverse consequences for their refusal to do so.  Judy Melinek et al., 
National Association of Medical Examiners Position Paper: Medical Examiner, Coroner, and 
Forensic Pathologist Independence, 3 ACAD. FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 93, 93 (2013).  A 
separate study found that over thirty percent of respondents altered their diagnostic decision 
making out of a fear of litigation.  Id.  Forensic pathologists have also been threatened with 
termination because their testimony was favorable to the defense.  Id. at 94.  Pressure from 
law enforcement is most likely to occur when the death is a high profile case or when a suspect 
has been named, especially when the police investigation is running into difficulties.  Id. 
 46  See Amy M. Jeanguenat & Itiel E. Dror, Human Factors Effecting Forensic Decision 
Making: Workplace Stress and Well‐being, 63 J. FORENSIC SCI. 258, 259 (2018).  For a 
discussion on fingerprint analysts’ fear of making errors, see David Charlton, Peter A.F. 
Fraser-Mackenzie & Itiel E. Dror, Emotional Experiences and Motivating Factors Associated 
with Fingerprint Analysis, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 385 (2010).   
 47  See, e.g., Sarah Fowler, The Shocking Realities of Underfunded State Crime Lab: “The 
Bodies Keep Stacking Up”, CLARION-LEDGER (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.clarionledger.com 
/story/news/local/2018/10/19/bodies-autopsies-stacking-up-mississippi-crime-
lab/978108002/. 
 48  See, e.g.,  Vicente Benavides, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.u 
mich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5315 (last updated Nov. 2, 2018) 
(twenty-one-month-old victim probably died from an accident, not rape, sodomy and murder 
by Benevides); Rodricus Crawford, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?case 
id=5123 (last updated Nov. 19, 2017) (cause of death was likely bronchopneumonia, not 
suffocation by smothering); Lynn Dejac, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3169 (last 
updated May 4, 2018) (victim died from cocaine overdose, not strangulation); Evin King, 
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ 
casedetail.aspx?caseid=5231 (last updated Oct. 12, 2018) (errors in coroner’s testimony and 
DNA profile was not of defendant). 
 49  For a harrowing account of the workings of one medical examiner’s office, see 
RADLEY BALKO & TUCKER CARRINGTON, THE CADAVER KING AND THE COUNTRY DENTIST:  A 
TRUE STORY OF INJUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 51 (2018).  For another recent example, 
see Vicente Benavides, supra note 48.  
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directly from the postmortem medical testing or autopsy.  Death 
investigations become difficult when the postmortem examinations fall short 
of providing a strong indication for the reason of death, which occurs with 
some regularity.  In such situations, the available evidence could point to a 
number of different explanations or offer no apparent explanation.  
Completing such investigations will invariably be assisted and enabled by 
the background information available in the case.  Vernard Adams and 
Charles Hirsch punctate the role of background information in reaching 
resolute death classifications in the face of ambiguity in the anatomical state 
of the body: “the degree of certainty with which the pathological findings 
translate into a cause of death depends on the nature of the available 
background information.”50 
Take the hypothetical example of an autopsy of a sixty-five-year-old 
man that reveals signs of heart failure with no other suspicious physiological 
signs.  The crux of the issue is that the autopsy findings readily fit a number 
of different explanations, each of which will hinge—to a large extent or 
exclusively—on background information.51  In one scenario, the 
examination seeks to explain the drowning of a person in the ocean.  After 
learning that decedent’s business was failing or that he was recently 
diagnosed with an untreatable disease, the death examiner might lean 
towards classifying the death as a suicide.  But upon learning that the 
decedent swam regularly in the ocean and that sea currents were treacherous 
on that fateful day, the death investigator may be led toward classifying the 
drowning as an accident.  By the same token, the drowning could also be 
understood as a homicide upon learning that the decedent was seen standing 
on the rocks while engaged in a heated argument with another person.  In a 
second scenario, the decedent—a jeweler—was found dead with traces of 
cyanide in his blood (a substance often used for cleaning jewelry).  After 
learning from family members that the man was recently widowed and 
seemed to be depressed, the pathologist might be inclined to suspect suicide.  
Upon learning, however, that the decedent was embroiled in a nasty business 
dispute with his partners in the jewelry business, the investigation might shift 
towards a homicide route.  In a third scenario, the death examiner learns that 
the decedent—a locksmith—collapsed and died while working with an 
electric drill.  The pathologist might suspect that the man died from natural 
causes, but if the circuitry of the drill turns out to be faulty, the death might 
appear as an accident, and perhaps even a homicide.  In the absence of any 
such background information, the pathologist will likely revert to the most 
 
 50  See Vernard I. Adams et al., Trauma and Disease, in SPITZ AND FISHER’S 
MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION OF DEATH: GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF PATHOLOGY 
TO CRIME INVESTIGATION 175–98, 186 (Werner U. Spitz ed., 3d ed. 1993). 
 51  See id. at 185. 
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probable natural explanation of the death.52 
The range of non-medical information that gets incorporated into actual 
death investigations is captured by the work of sociologist Stefan 
Timmermans, who conducted an extensive field observation of a medical 
examiner office in action.53  For example, in examining the death of a 
middle-aged man who suffered from diabetes, the examiner took into 
account half-written letters authored by the decedent that suggested 
emotional anguish, the content of his refrigerator, empty bottles of alcohol 
strewn around his apartment, and information regarding poor relationships 
with family members.54  In examining the death of a woman by drowning, 
the examiner considered the woman’s employment troubles, physical 
damage to her car, records of psychological treatment, her choice of music, 
and a letter that she wrote to her favorite band.55  Timmermans reports other 
instances where death examiners incorporated into their decisions evidence 
of alcohol and drug use, gun ownership, driving record, criminal record, risk 
taking behaviors, logs of phone calls, current and past relationships, 
childhood trauma, financial hardship, emotional outbursts, and much more.56  
Various court decisions reveal that medical examiners have classified deaths 
as homicides based primarily on non-medical evidence, such as a police 
investigator’s statements regarding an earlier fight between the defendant 
and the victim,57 a police investigators’ belief that the victim was pushed off 
his chair,58 and the death examiner’s own inferences about the defendant’s 
reckless driving.59 
 
 
 
 52  See STEFAN TIMMERMANS, POSTMORTEM: HOW MEDICAL EXAMINERS EXPLAIN 
SUSPICIOUS DEATHS 50 (2006).   
 53  The medical examiner’s office studied by Timmermans, which served a metropolitan 
area of about one million people, had two permanent forensic pathologists during the three-
year period of observation.  Id. at 33.  At different points in time, one or two additional 
forensic pathologists were employed by the office.  Id.   
 54  See id. at 42, 92.  
 55  Id. at 82–83. 
 56  Id.; see also Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis, supra note 40.  
According to the standards promulgated by the NAME, members can take into consideration 
non-medical sources of information, including judgments of intent to harm and use of 
violence.  See Peterson & Clark, supra note 34, at 225. 
 57  State v. Sosnowicz, 270 P.3d 917, 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 
 58  State v. Vining, 645 A.2d 20, 20 (Me. 1994).  
 59  State v. Jamerson, 708 A.2d 1183, 1189 (N.J. 1998).  Note that in Jamerson, 
Sosnowicz, and Vining, the courts ruled that the examiners’ conclusions were not admissible 
as expert testimony.  Id. at 1193–94; Sosnowicz, 270 P.3d at 925; Vining, 645 A.2d at 21.  
Though in Sosnowicz and Vining, the faulty admission of testimony was considered harmless 
error, and thus did not affect the underlying convictions.  Sosnowicz, 270 A.2d at 925; Vining, 
645 A.2d at 21.   
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To help assess the possible effects of this vast array of information, this 
Article proposes a typology of the different varieties of background 
information that often make their way into medicolegal death investigations.  
These types of information can be clustered into four, somewhat rough, 
categories, one pertaining to the decedent’s medical history and three to non-
medical facets of the case: 
1. Medical history.  The decedent’s medical history will often point the 
investigation to a likely illness or medical condition that helps explain 
the death.  Medical history is typically gleaned from hospital records, 
primary care physicians, emergency response reports, and statements 
by family members, friends, and caregivers.  The medical history can 
also include the decedent’s mental and psychological history.  In 
abovementioned hypothetical scenarios, the previously diagnosed 
untreatable disease would be a candidate explanation for the death of 
the drowned person, as would be a history of cardiac failures for the 
locksmith’s death (assuming such were found in the records). 
2. Findings from the death scene.  These include the state of the body and 
its position relative to the death scene, blood markings, weapons, tools, 
drug paraphernalia, alcohol containers, medicine containers, syringes, 
and the like.  Death scene information is derived mostly from 
observations and items of evidence collected by the medicolegal scene 
investigator (a member of the medical examiner’s team) or by the 
police.  In the abovementioned scenarios, the treacherous sea currents 
in the drowning case and the finding of the malfunctioning drill in the 
case of the electrocuted locksmith would amount to death scene 
findings.  In the case of the deceased jeweler, the hypothesis of 
poisoning by cyanide might not have arisen absent the death scene 
finding of a residue of a colored liquid at the bottom of the jeweler’s 
glass. 
3. Social history.  The social history typically pertains to the life 
circumstances of the decedent and other protagonists, including 
professional hazards, risk taking behavior, alcohol or drug use, sexual 
habits, social circles, financial hardship, employment status, and the 
like.  The social history is typically collected from the decedent’s 
family members, friends, associates or caregivers, or from phone 
records, social media, and the like.  In the abovementioned scenarios, 
the failing business of the drowned person and the jeweler’s depression 
and business dispute would count as social history. 
4. Information from the police investigation.  This typically pertains to 
reports about the progress of the police investigation, statements from 
witnesses, statements made by a suspect, other forensic findings, the 
detectives’ theories, and the like.  Investigative updates are typically 
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conveyed by the detectives to the forensic pathologist or the 
medicolegal scene investigator, either through ongoing 
communication or during the autopsy itself.  In the abovementioned 
scenario concerning the drowning victim, the statement that the 
decedent was seen arguing with another person on the rocks prior to 
the death would usually originate from the police investigation. 
 These four types of information are listed in descending order of 
proximity to the scientific core of forensic pathology.  As we move away 
from medical history towards social history and information from the police 
investigation, the information becomes further removed from the expertise 
of the forensic pathologist and the reliability of the sources becomes more 
difficult for her to discern.  As discussed below, the decedent’s medical 
history will invariably be reliable, relevant, and diagnostic for the task at 
hand.  Similarly, information gleaned from the death scene investigation will 
often be essential to understand the basic facts about the occurrence of the 
death and, as long as it used for drawing of reasonable inferences, it will 
usually also be reliable.  The same cannot be said, however, for the social 
history and information from the police investigation.  These types of 
information will tend to be relatively unreliable, difficult to ascertain, and 
conducive to conjecture.60  We will also see that the descent down this list 
marks a shift from information that serves mostly for making determinations 
of cause of death towards information used mostly in determinations of 
manner of death.61 
B. Two Routes of Potential Error 
To help illustrate the potential problems stemming from the effects of 
exposure to non-medical background information, we turn to the case of 
Hillary Lee Tyler, who was convicted by an Iowa court for the homicide of 
her newborn baby.62  Baby Tyler was found dead in a hotel room checked 
out to Hillary Tyler, where she admitted to having delivered the baby by 
herself.63  The central issue was whether the baby was stillborn (or died 
immediately after birth), in which case the mother bore no criminal liability, 
or whether he was born alive and survived for a sufficient period for her to 
drown him, which would amount to homicide, namely, murder.64  The baby’s 
death was investigated by Dr. Jonathan Thompson, an Associate State 
Medical Examiner trained in the field of forensic pathology.65  After 
 
 60  See infra note 171-175 and accompanying text. 
 61  See text preceding note 155 supra. 
 62  State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 143–44 (Iowa 2015). 
 63  Id. at 145. 
 64  Id. at 150. 
 65  Id. at 148. 
SIMON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2018  2:12 PM 
272 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:255 
performing the autopsy and conducting various pathological testing, Dr. 
Thompson could not determine conclusively whether the baby was stillborn 
or was drowned after taking his first breath, and thus listed both the cause 
and manner of Baby Tyler’s death as “undetermined.”66  Dr. Thompson was 
subsequently informed by the detectives that they obtained statements from 
Hillary Tyler according to which she had drowned her child.67  The 
statements, which Tyler subsequently recanted, were obtained during the 
police’s interrogation of Tyler one day following the traumatic delivery, 
before she had received any post-partum medical care or psychological care 
relating to the loss of her newborn child.68  In his final report, Dr. Thompson 
certified the cause of death as “bathtub drowning” and the manner of death 
as “homicide” and also testified to that effect in court.69  After hearing the 
evidence, including Dr. Thompson’s testimony, the jury convicted Tyler of 
second-degree murder and other charges.70 
The role that Dr. Thompson’s investigation played in the prosecution 
of Tyler was rife with problems.  For one, the linchpin of his 
determinations—the defendant’s alleged confession obtained by the police 
detectives—is quintessentially non-medical information and thus lies outside 
the expertise of a forensic pathologist.  The reliance on this non-medical 
information throws into question the admissibility of Dr. Thompson’s 
conclusions as expert testimony under the rules of evidence.71  Second, the 
admission of Dr. Thompson’s testimony rubs against the fundamental 
principle that the ultimate assignment of criminal liability is vested 
exclusively in the province of the jury.  The jury should serve the function 
of the all-source expert, while the medical examiner’s role should be limited 
only to providing the medical findings to assist in that determination. 
 
 
 
 66  Dr. Thompson testified that he found fluid in Baby Tyler’s lungs.  Id. at 151.  He also 
explained, however, that this fluid was, at least in part, amniotic fluid, and that because 
amniotic fluid is, in part, composed of water, there was no scientific basis for determining 
whether some of the fluid was bathwater.  Id.  Based on the autopsy, Dr. Thompson reported 
that Baby Tyler may have taken a breath because the alveoli in the lungs were partially 
expanded, a finding that would also be consistent with the production of methane gas by 
bacteria found in the body after death.  Id. 
 67  According to the police, Tyler was said to have stated that “she had given birth the 
previous day in the motel room and then placed the infant in a bathtub partially filled with 
water shortly after the birth. The baby reportedly moved and cried after birth.”  Id. at 148. 
 68  Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 146–47. 
 69  It should be noted that the Tyler case is somewhat exceptional, in that the death 
examiner relied on the non-medical information in determining both the cause and manner of 
death.  Id.  In most cases, the non-medical information plays a role just in the manner of death 
determinations. 
 70  Id. at 152. 
 71  FED. R. EVID. 702.  
SIMON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2018  2:12 PM 
2019] MINIMIZING ERROR AND BIAS 273 
Third, exposing the jury to the expert’s ultimate conclusion could 
distort the jury’s decision by overweighting the confession information 
relied upon by the medical examiner.  As suggested by Professor Bill 
Thompson (not to be confused with forensic pathologist Jonathan 
Thompson), background information might be double-counted by the fact 
finder: both as providing direct probative support for the ultimate conclusion 
(say, a confession strengthening the appearance of a suspect’s guilt) and 
through its indirect effect on the forensic conclusion (relying on the forensic 
examiner’s conclusion, which was colored by the same confession).72  The 
fact-finder will likely be unaware of the impact of the background 
information on the purported scientific conclusion offered by the forensic 
examiner, and will thus view those items as two independent pieces of 
evidence.  In other words, the two items will likely be perceived as 
corroborative.  True corroboration, however, requires that each item of 
evidence be conditionally independent of each other.  Treating non-
independent items as corroborative is a fundamental violation of the 
principle of corroboration, amounting to the hollow specter of pseudo-
corroboration.73  This prospect is particularly troubling in light of the fact 
that death determinations do not require high standards of proof, and often 
suffice with low thresholds, such as the fifty-one percent confidence rule.74  
Thus, juries that rely heavily on death examiners’ determinations might be 
placing undue weight on weakly-formed conclusions. 
Indeed, Tyler’s conviction was overturned by the State’s Supreme 
Court.75  The Iowa Supreme Court did not find fault with Dr. Thompson’s 
investigation, but with the trial judge’s decision to admit it into evidence.76  
 
 72  See William C. Thompson, What Role Should Investigative Facts Play in the 
Evaluation of Scientific Evidence?, 43 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 123, 131 (2011) [hereinafter 
Thompson, What Role Should Investigative Facts Play]; see also Thompson, Determining the 
Proper Evidentiary Basis, supra note 40, at 134–35. 
 73  DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 148, 181 
(2012).  Saul Kassin has similarly proposed the construct of illusion of corroboration.  See 
Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOL. 431, 437 (2012).  
 74  See TIMMERMANS, supra note 52, at 92.  The low thresholds seem to explain the fact 
that only about three percent of cases investigated by medical examination offices go 
unclassified (that is, they earn the classification of “undetermined”).  See, e.g., ANDREW 
BAKER, HENNEPIN CTY. MED. EXAM’RS OFFICE, HENNEPIN CTY. MED. EXAM’R 2016 ANNUAL 
REPORT 11, 12 (2017), https://www.hennepin.us/-/media/hennepinus/residents/public-
safety/documents/me-annual-report-2016.pdf?la=en; PATTY HAYES & RICHARD HARRUFF, 
KING CTY. MED. EXAM’RS OFFICE, KING CTY. MED. EXAM’R ANNUAL REPORT 2016 11, 12 
(2017), https://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/health/examiner/~/media/depts/health/medical-
examiner/ documents/King-County-Medical-Examiner-2016-Annual-Report.ashx; GLENN 
WAGNER, CTY. OF SAN DIEGO DEP’T OF THE MED. EXAM’R, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 62 
(2017), https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/dam/sdc/me/docs/ SDME%20Annual%20 
Report%202016.pdf. 
 75  State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 144 (Iowa 2015). 
 76  Id. 
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The court ruled that admitting the autopsy report into evidence and allowing 
Dr. Thompson to testify to the cause and manner of Baby Tyler’s death 
amounted to an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.77  The crux of the 
reversal was that the medical examiner’s conclusion rested to a large degree 
on the uncorroborated statements that the defendant allegedly made to the 
police, as opposed to objective, scientific, or medical evidence.78  For the 
reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it seems beyond dispute that 
the Iowa court reached the correct conclusion.79 
Still, finding fault with the judge’s decision does little to shed light on 
the problem, if any, with Dr. Thompson’s investigation itself.  One 
possibility is to treat the Tyler investigation as an exemplar of an 
investigation that was affected by context bias.  The critique would be that 
Dr. Thompson’s exposure to the incriminating statements by the suspect 
could have compromised his ability to conduct this investigation and 
interpret the ambiguous evidence in a scientific and objective manner.80  
Indeed, the context bias does pose a risk of skewing conclusions of death 
investigations,81 and we should keep that risk in mind when devising future 
guidelines.  But, the context bias is characterized by two features: it occurs 
beneath the level of conscious awareness and produces non-normative 
inferences, that is, inferences that examiners would not condone had they be 
made aware of them.82  Upon closer examination, neither of those features 
 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. at 150.   
 79  In April 2017, pending a retrial, Tyler pleaded guilty to child endangerment causing 
serious injury, first-degree criminal mischief, and abuse of a corpse  See Peter Kaspari, Tyler 
Plea Deal Averts Another Trial, MESSENGER (Apr. 12, 2017), www.messengernews.net/news/ 
local-news/2017/04/tyler-plea-deal-averts-another-trial/.  She was sentenced to serve up to 
twenty years in prison.  Id. 
 80  Indeed, in internal discussions within the OSAC, the Human Factors Committee has 
tended to treat the Tyler investigation as an exemplar of an investigation that was affected by 
context bias.  
 81  Recall that Dr. Thompson received the information from the police after having 
conducted the medical examination and having written a preliminary autopsy report.  See 
supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.  But it is not hard to imagine a different scenario 
in which Dr. Thompson first learned about Tyler’s alleged confessions prior to performing 
the medical examination.  It is quite possible that exposure to the apparently damning 
information would have led Dr. Thompson to believe in Tyler’s guilt, which could set the 
stage for interpreting the ambiguous medical exam as supportive of homicide.  In such a 
scenario, the single official record would indicate “death by drowning” as the cause of death 
and “homicide” as the manner of death, and we might never have learned that these 
determinations were in fact driven by non-medical background information.  Such an 
eventuality would have amounted to a classic instantiation of the context bias.   
 82  See William C. Thompson, Interpretation: Observer Effects, in WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 171 (Allan Jamieson & Andre A. Moenssens eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
Thompson, Interpretation]; Steve D. Charman et al., Cognitive Bias in the Legal System: 
Police Officers Evaluate Ambiguous Evidence in a Belief-Consistent Manner, 6 J. APPLIED 
RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 193 (2017); Itiel E. Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better of 
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were present in Dr. Thompson’s investigation.  Rather, Dr. Thompson 
frankly acknowledged in his documentation and courtroom testimony that 
he based his final conclusion on the suspect’s putative confession, namely, 
on non-medical information.83  On cross examination, Dr. Thompson 
confirmed that the various medical tests he conducted—including the 
autopsy, the toxicology test, the examination of the lungs, the examination 
of the stomach contents—had all led him to an inconclusive determination.  
Then, in response to the following question: 
And the only way that you reached the conclusion of homicide as 
the manner of death, as drowning as a cause of death, is through 
observing and watching the videotapes that the law enforcement 
officers supplied to you, correct? 
Dr. Thompson replied “Yes, it is.”84 
Dr. Thompson’s frank report makes it clear that he was not 
subconsciously biased by the putative confession, but rather that he relied on 
that crucial information consciously and deliberately.  Thus, Baby Tyler’s 
death investigation had little to do with the context bias.  The concern is 
much simpler and it lies in plain sight.  The issue is whether death examiners 
ought to incorporate non-medical background information of unknown 
reliability into their decision mix.  The crux of the issue, then, is not cognitive 
in nature, but relates more to the legal and normative aspects of death 
examination. 
Hence, this Article proposes that there are two different coexistent 
routes by which reliance on background information can lead to mistaken 
death investigative conclusions: first, the cognitive route via the context bias, 
wherein exposure to illicit information skews death investigations towards 
non-normative conclusions without the investigator being conscious of that 
effect.  Second, via the conscious and deliberate incorporation of non-
medical information of unknown reliability into the decision.  For 
illustration, it seems uncontroversial that radiologists consciously and 
deliberately rely on x-rays, hiring committees rely on letters of 
recommendation, and weather forecasters use models of prior weather data 
to make predictions.  Yet, that reliance becomes problematic when a 
 
Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-Down Processing on Matching Fingerprints, 19 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 799, 801 (2005) [hereinafter Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better 
of Us]; Peter A.F. Fraser-Mackenzie et al., Cognitive and Contextual Influences in 
Determination of Latent Fingerprint Suitability for Identification Judgments, 53 SCI. & JUST. 
144 (2013) [hereinafter Fraser-Mackenzie et al., Cognitive and Contextual Influences]; Saul 
M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed 
Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42, 44 (2013) [hereinafter Kassin, The 
Forensic Confirmation Bias]; Larry S. Miller, Bias Among Forensic Document Examiners: A 
Need for Procedural Change, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407 (1984). 
 83  See supra note 78 and accompanying text.   
 84  State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 150 (Iowa 2015). 
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radiologist reads an x-ray that is blurry or that might not be of the correct 
patient, when a hiring committee values a letter of recommendation that 
bears signs of inauthenticity, and when a weather forecaster uses data 
collected by means of a defunct technology.  Such practices are simply 
inadequate and unsuitable for the task, regardless of whether they trigger 
context bias. 
As it will turn out, we need not belabor the arduous task of 
distinguishing between the two routes, as they can both be addressed by 
means of the same mechanism, namely, context management.  Still, for both 
conceptual and practical purposes, this Article will focus the debate on the 
conscious-deliberate route.  Following Occam’s razor principle,85 this 
explanation should be preferred for its simplicity and directness.  Still, it is 
important to stay attuned to the context bias because the risk of unconscious 
bias is ever-present in forensic investigations, as it is throughout all forms of 
human judgment. 
C. Task-Relevance and the Cost-Benefit Calculus 
In most forensic context, the concept of task-relevance is the 
touchstone for determining which information to manage.86  The concept 
embodies the notion that information should be used only when it is 
necessary for the performance of the forensic task, and should be withheld 
when it serves to reach a conclusion through an inferential path that lies 
outside of the established forensic science.87  In pattern comparison 
disciplines, the contours of task-relevance are strict and consistent and are 
thus determinable ex ante.  Pattern comparison analysts are charged with 
testing the specific specimens and those specimens alone, and with 
employing a methodology that is well-defined in advance.  Any information 
that falls outside the contours of that task and confines of that methodology 
will invariably be deemed irrelevant to the task.  One could easily imagine 
that knowing the type of surface from which a latent print was lifted could 
be relevant to the task by helping the analyst examine and interpret the print 
 
 85  See, e.g., Dorothy Walsh, Occam’s Razor: A Principle of Intellectual Elegance, 16 
AM. PHIL. Q. 241, 241–44 (1979). 
 86  See Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis, supra note 40. 
 87  In formal terms, information is considered task-relevant if it is necessary for drawing 
conclusions about the propositions in question, from the physical evidence that has been 
designated for examination through the correct application of an accepted analytic method by 
a competent analyst.  Information is task-irrelevant if it is not necessary for drawing 
conclusions about the propositions in question, if it assists only in drawing conclusions from 
something other than the physical evidence designated for examination, or if it assists only in 
drawing conclusions by some means other than an appropriate analytic method.  See NAT’L 
COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIEWS OF HUMAN FACTORS 
SUBCOMMITTEE: ENSURING THAT FORENSIC ANALYSIS IS BASED UPON TASK-RELEVANT 
INFORMATION 7 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/641676/download. 
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correctly.  But aspects of the case that do not bear directly on the examination 
and interpretation of the specimens—for example, a suspect’s criminal 
record, a confession, or an eyewitness’ account—cannot be considered 
relevant to the comparison of the friction ridges of the prints.  The neat 
demarcation of task-relevance in this type of task makes the decision to apply 
context management easy and straightforward.88 
Task-relevance, however, does not always yield definitive conclusions.  
For one, in some situations, the demarcation of relevance might not be clear-
cut.  This is particularly true for forensic disciplines that entail complex, 
sprawling, iterative, and open-ended reasoning processes.  Moreover, 
information might be considered task-relevant, yet still capable of biasing 
the conclusion in one way or another.  In these situations, the appropriateness 
of context management should hinge on a more nuanced and contextualized 
analysis of how the treatment would impact the investigation.89  This 
calculus can be boiled down to the following three components: 
1. The effect on investigative accuracy.  Context management will be 
justified to the extent that the overall impact of withholding it from the 
examiner will contribute to the accuracy of the investigation.  
Withholding information that is inaccurate is likely to sway the 
investigation toward an accurate conclusion, whereas that same 
intervention could also withhold accurate information and thus reduce 
the accuracy of the investigative conclusion.  Hence the need to 
balance out the measure’s countervailing effects.  As discussed below, 
the concern over inaccurate conclusions stems not only from the 
accuracy of the information itself, but also from its susceptibility to be 
over-interpreted.90 
2. The effect on investigative efficacy.  Background information can also 
serve the investigative function by enabling the generation of 
investigative hypotheses that would not be contemplated in its absence.  
 
 88  It is also noteworthy that much of the pattern comparison bench work is performed 
after the passage of time since the commencement of the investigation.  By that point, the 
police are more likely to have accumulated evidence about the criminal event and have 
possibly named a suspect, and they might also be feeling pressure to solve the case.  In other 
words, pattern comparison tasks are often performed in an environment wherein the examiner 
is subjected to an expectation to provide a conclusion that is supportive of a particular theory.  
On the concept of “case construction,” see Martin Innes, The ‘Process Structures’ of Police 
Homicide Investigations, 42 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 669, 672 (2002).  MIKE MCCONVILLE, 
ANDREW SANDERS & RICHARD LENG, THE CASE FOR THE PROSECUTION:  POLICE SUSPECTS AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINALITY 11-13 (1991). 
 89  Dror et al., Letter to the Editor, supra note 14, at 276 (“For forensic science to 
successfully take on the issue of contextual bias, it is important that one correctly considers 
the risks, that measures are taken when needed, and that they are proportionate and 
appropriate.”). 
 90  See infra note 173-174 and accompanying text. 
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To the extent that withholding such information will prevent the 
generation of hypotheses and result in incomplete or inconclusive 
outcomes, context management hinders the efficacy of the 
investigative effort. 
3. Feasibility and logistical burdens.  Context management procedures 
will not be justified if they undermine the feasibility of the 
investigative process or impose undue burdens on it.  Such 
impediments include logistical burdens, personnel requirements, 
coordination difficulties, extra costs, and the like. 
As will be discussed below, for all its nuance, this cost-benefit 
framework falls short of offering a decisive solution regarding the 
justification of context management in death examinations.  It does, 
however, help flush out the complexity of the issues involved and thus 
demonstrates the intractability of the issue at hand. 
III. ABDUCTIVE REASONING 
An intuitive and appealing suggestion to correct for the possible 
influences of background information is to treat death investigation like 
other forensic disciplines and subject it to a blanket requirement of context 
management.  This temporary masking should serve to prevent task-
irrelevant information from affecting investigative outcomes, regardless of 
whether that information would have been consciously incorporated into the 
forensic decision or whether it would have biased the decision 
unconsciously.  Though, before we attempt to transpose a corrective measure 
from one domain to the next, it is incumbent on us to gain a close 
understanding of the cognitive processes entailed in the performance of each 
task.  Pattern comparison is comprised primarily of straightforward cognitive 
tasks, such as characterization of stimuli,91 choosing thresholds,92 as well as 
 
 91  See Thomas A. Busey & Itiel E. Dror, Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in Forensic 
Expertise, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 15-3 (Alan McRoberts 
ed., 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225320.pdf; Saks et al., Context Effects in 
Forensic Science, supra note 9, at 79. 
 92  See Itiel E. Dror, Human Expert Performance in Forensic Decision Making: Seven 
Different Sources of Bias, 49 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 541 (2017).  
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reasoning by way of induction93 and deduction.94  The death investigation 
task, however, cannot be adequately addressed by these reasoning processes.  
Rather, death investigations are better understood as requiring a far more 
complex, sprawling, iterative, and open-ended form of reasoning.  The 
model of reasoning that is best suited to capture this type of mental process 
is abductive reasoning.  This Part of the Article is devoted to familiarizing 
ourselves with this model of reasoning. 
A. The Abductive Reasoning Process 
The theory of abductive reasoning emanates from the work of the 
American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.  Abductive reasoning 
provides a good account of how people go about conducting investigations 
into the occurrence of events, that is, how they infer the correct cause from 
the many possible ones.  As we will soon see, the process is comprised of 
three sub-processes, or functions: the generation of hypotheses, the testing 
of hypotheses, and the evaluation of hypotheses. 
Most contemporary philosophers, including Gil Harman,95 Paul 
Thagard,96 Peter Lipton,97 and Igor Douven98 focus on the evaluation phase 
of the process, which is known as the inference to the best explanation.  At 
its core, hypothesis evaluation follows the logic of “[g]iven evidence E and 
candidate explanations H1, . . . , Hn of E, infer the truth of that Hi which best 
explains E.”99  Peter Lipton offers a slightly more nuanced definition: “Given 
our data and our background beliefs, we infer what would, if true, provide 
the best of the competing explanations we can generate for those data (so 
 
 93  See Lorenzo Magnani, Abductive Reasoning: Philosophical and Educational 
Perspectives in Medicine, in ADVANCED MODELS OF COGNITION FOR MEDICAL TRAINING AND 
PRACTICE 21 (David A. Evans & Vimla L. Patel eds., 1992); Vimla L. Patel et al., Thinking 
and Reasoning in Medicine, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 
727, 730–31 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005) [hereinafter Patel et al., 
Thinking and Reasoning in Medicine]; Anton E. Lawson & Erno S. Daniel, Inferences of 
Clinical Diagnostic Reasoning and Diagnostic Error, 44 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 402–
12 (2011); James Hawthorne, Inductive Logic, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2018). 
 94  See Lawson & Daniel, supra note 93, at 404; Magnani, supra note 93, at 21–23; Patel 
et al., Thinking and Reasoning in Medicine, supra note 93, at 730–31.  On reasoning by 
induction, see Stewart Shapiro & Teresa Kouri Kissel, Classical Logic, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-classical/#3 (last updated Mar. 11, 2018). 
 95  Gilbert H. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88, 88–95 
(1965). 
 96  Paul R. Thagard, The Unity of Peirce’s Theory of Hypothesis, 13 TRANSACTIONS 
CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 112, 112–21 (1977); see also Igor Douven, Abduction, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 9, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/ 
abduction/. 
 97  PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 56 (1st ed. 1991). 
 98  Douven, supra note 96. 
 99  Id. 
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long as the best is good enough for us to make any inference at all).”100  The 
criteria for determining the soundness of an explanation do not lend 
themselves to a formal definition.  Peirce recommended favoring hypotheses 
that seem simple, natural, and plausible, preferring theories that explain wide 
ranges of phenomena, employing analogous theories that have proved 
successful in other areas of inquiry, and conserving resources.101  Other 
choice indicia include simplicity, generality, and compatibility with well-
established theories.102  To be sure, the task must also entail a thorough 
appreciation of the diagnostic and explanatory potential of the object of 
inquiry; that is, the causal and statistical relationship between the observed 
phenomenon and the proposed explanatory hypothesis.  The best explanation 
would be the hypothesis which, on balance, meets these criteria sufficiently 
and more so than any other hypothesis.103 
It must be acknowledged that hypotheses do not present themselves out 
of thin air.  Rather, they must be generated by the investigator.  But herein 
lies a paradox.  The simple truth is that it is absolutely prohibitive to explore 
the inordinate number—trillions according to one account104—of hypotheses 
or to conduct every conceivable test.  Without evidence, one cannot draw 
any inferences about the validity of the hypotheses, but without a hypothesis, 
one cannot know which evidence to test.  Hence the need for an initial set of 
hypotheses.  Indeed, Pierce himself focused less on the evaluation of 
hypothesis and more on the discovery aspect, namely, the “process of 
forming an explanatory hypothesis.”105  With the exception of obvious cases, 
there is no reason to expect that an examiner’s first attempt will reliably 
strike the only true hypothesis out of the many that could conceivably shed 
 
 100  LIPTON, supra note 97, at 58. 
 101  See CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, PEIRCE: THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS 225–26 
(1985); CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, 
VOLUMES 1–8 (Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss & Arthur W. Burks eds., 1932-1958).   
 102  See Douven, supra note 96; LIPTON, supra note 97; Thagard, supra note 96. 
 103  See Harman, supra note 95; LIPTON, supra note 97; Thagard, supra note 96.  To be 
sure, choosing the best available hypothesis cannot be justified when it fails to meet 
independent indicia of validity.  If that were the case, inference to the best explanation could 
lead to trust “the best of a bad lot.”  BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, LAWS AND SYMMETRY 143 (1989); 
see also Douven, supra note 96.  
 104  K.T. FANN, PEIRCE’S THEORY OF ABDUCTION 42 (1970); see also William H. B. 
McAuliffe, How Did Abduction Get Confused with Inference to the Best Explanation?, 51 
TRANSACTIONS CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 300, 304–05 (2015). 
 105  5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: 
PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM 171 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1935) 
[hereinafter PEIRCE VOL. 5]; see also CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE NATURE OF MEANING (1903), 
reprinted in 2 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (1893–1913) 208, 
216–17 (Peirce Edition Project ed., 1998) [hereinafter PEIRCE, THE NATURE OF MEANING]; 
Daniel G. Campos, On the Distinction Between Peirce’s Abduction and Lipton’s Inference to 
the Best Explanation, 180 SYNTHESE 419, 427 (2011); Douven, supra note 96.  
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explanatory light on the decision.  Thus, abduction serves as a “selection 
function,”106 a “search strategy.”107  Peirce’s solution to the paradox was to 
offer a bootstrapping mechanism, driven by the process of generating 
hypotheses and subjecting them to empirical testing.108 
Naturally, the inferential process cannot progress without the testing of 
evidence.  Hypotheses will be chosen if they offer feasibly testable 
propositions, and the corresponding tests will be chosen if they have 
diagnostic potential and are strongly associated with the hypotheses.  
Throughout the testing phase, some hypotheses will receive empirical 
support and thus be deemed worthy of further testing and evaluation.109  
Other hypotheses will be ruled out and set aside, as new ones should be 
generated and put to the test.110  In all, the process of generation and testing 
of hypotheses operates as a selection mechanism to determine which of the 
possible causes are to be considered promising explanatory propositions and 
passed on for further consideration.111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 106  Douven, supra note 96.  
 107  Gerhard Schurz, Patterns of Abduction, 164 SYNTHESE 201, 205 (2008). 
 108  CHARLES S. PEIRCE, DEDUCTION, INDUCTION, AND HYPOTHESIS (1878), reprinted in 3 
WRITINGS OF CHARLES S. PEIRCE: A CHRONOLOGICAL EDITION (1872–1878) 323, 331–32 
(Christian J. W. Kloesel et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter PEIRCE, DEDUCTION, INDUCTION, AND 
HYPOTHESIS]; see also McAuliffe, supra note 104, at 307; Schurz, supra note 107, at 201–34. 
 109  See Harry G. Frankfurt, Peirce’s Notion of Abduction, 55 J. PHIL. 593 (1958). 
 110  In Peirce’s words: 
If that supposition be correct, a certain sensible result is to be expected 
under certain circumstances which can be created, or at any rate are to be 
met with. The question is, will this be the result?  If Nature replies “No!” 
the experimenter has gained an important piece of knowledge.  If Nature 
says “Yes,” the experimenter’s ideas remain just as they were only 
somewhat more deeply engrained.  If Nature says “Yes” to the first twenty 
questions, although they were so devised as to render that answer as 
surprising as possible, the experimenter will be confident that he is on the 
right track, since 2 to the 20th power exceeds a million. 
PEIRCE VOL. 5, supra note 105, at 168; see also PEIRCE, DEDUCTION, INDUCTION, AND 
HYPOTHESIS, supra note 108, at 217–21; see also PEIRCE, THE NATURE OF MEANING, supra 
note 105, at 217–18; McAuliffe, supra note 104, at 304–05. 
 111  See Douven, supra note 96; Schurz, supra note 107, at 205.  Anderson and Twining 
define abductive reasoning to be a “creative process of using known data to generate 
hypotheses to be tested by further investigation.”  TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, 
ANALYSIS EVIDENCE: HOW TO DO THINGS WITH FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE’S SCIENCE OF 
JUDICIAL PROOF 443 (3d ed. 1998). 
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Eventually, the process will evolve into hypothesis evaluation.112  This 
phase will come to a quicker close when just one hypothesis receives 
overwhelming empirical substantiation, thus offering an investigative 
conclusion.  Additionally, the process can come to an end when none of the 
explored hypotheses has been empirically substantiated and the stock of 
hypotheses has been exhausted.  In such instances, the investigation will 
remain unsolved.  The evaluation function is most consequential when a 
number of hypotheses have received partial empirical support and appear to 
be viable candidates.  At this point, the decision maker engages in an 
inference to the best explanation seeking to identify the best (and good 
enough) explanation.  While abductive reasoning is hardly perfect—and, 
indeed, is not immune from cognitive biases and errors—one would be hard 
pressed to propose a more reasonable, feasible, and effective method for 
conducting complex investigative tasks. 
B. Abductive Reasoning in Medical Decision Making 
Before taking a closer look at how abductive reasoning serves the 
discipline of forensic pathology, it is worth noting that it plays in the broader 
field of medical diagnostic reasoning.  To help demonstrate this observation, 
one can follow an illustration offered by Anton Lawson & Erna Daniel of a 
thirty-five-year-old female patient who presents for evaluation due to 
malaise and abdominal discomfort in the right upper quadrant.  The 
symptoms had worsened gradually over a period of ten days.  Naturally, to 
treat the patient, the physician first needs to make a diagnosis, that is, to 
discern the cause of the symptoms.  Based on the complaint alone, the 
physician could have generated a slew of hypotheses.  For now, however, 
the physician might suffice with six viable hypotheses that make up the 
differential diagnosis.  The primary methods of testing the hypotheses 
include taking the patient’s medical history, performing a physical 
examination, conducting laboratory and imaging tests, observation, and the 
treatment itself.113 
 
 
 
 112  See McAuliffe, supra note 104, at 303.  Lipton characterized abductive reasoning as 
consisting of two “epistemic filters,” with one filter serving to select a group of plausible 
explanations from a vast pool of possible explanations, and the second filter selecting the best 
explanation from that group.  LIPTON, supra note 97, at 60–61; see also Campos, supra note 
105, at 434.  In reality, it seems, the two processes are somewhat intermeshed.  See Paul 
Thagard, Abductive Inference: From Philosophical Analysis to Neural Mechanisms, in 
INDUCTIVE REASONING: EXPERIMENTAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND COMPUTATIONAL 
APPROACHES 226 (Aidan Fenney & Evan Heit eds., 2007); McAuliffe, supra note 104, at 303–
04. 
 113  See Lawson & Daniel, supra note 93, at 407. 
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One leading hypothesis is that the patient is suffering from a gallbladder 
disease.  To test that prospect, the physician should obtain the patient’s 
medical history, with an eye towards ascertaining whether the discomfort 
appeared acutely, whether it radiates to the shoulder, whether the area is 
tender, and whether the patient has fever or chills.  The possibility of a 
gallbladder disease could also be tested by a physical exam, in that applying 
pressure on the gallbladder should reproduce the patient’s pain.  The 
gallbladder hypothesis could also be tested diagnostically, in that an 
ultrasound should reveal abnormalities, such as a gallstone or a distended 
gallbladder.  Other hypotheses include an abnormal accumulation of gas in 
the hepatic flexure, a gastrointestinal ulcer, an inflammation of the rib 
junction, a variety of liver diseases caused by excessive alcohol intake or 
other toxic exposure, or by hepatitis A, B, C or any other viral infection.114  
Since each hypothesis is associated with different physical symptoms and is 
expected to produce different results on diagnostic examinations, the 
physician will need to conduct different testing procedures for the different 
hypotheses.115  The impact of each incoming test result on the respective 
hypothesis will be assessed based on the inferential support it provides, its 
verification, adequacy, parsimony, and falsifiability.116 
At the culmination of the rounds of testing, the physician engages in 
the phase of hypothesis evaluation.  She might find that only one of the 
hypotheses is strongly supported by the tests.  That hypothesis will normally 
be deemed as the diagnosis, which will thereafter dictate the course of 
treatment.  It is possible also that all six hypotheses are refuted by the 
evidence, which could lead the physician to dig deeper to generate additional 
hypotheses or to refer the patient to a specialist.  It is also possible that more 
 
 114  To be sure, this list of hypotheses is not exhaustive.  Lawson and Daniel also list an 
injury to the ribcage, the Fitz-Hugh-Curtis Syndrome, kidney problems (such as a renal tumor 
or kidney stones), a pleurisy/lung source, and other possible explanations that were not yet 
considered.  See Lawson & Daniel, supra note 93, at 407. 
 115  For example, the discomfort from an abnormal accumulation of gas in the hepatic 
flexure should be reduced by bowel movements or by taking milk of magnesia or laxatives.  
A gastrointestinal ulcer should be relieved by taking antacids, and the laboratory results 
should show blood in the stool.  An inflammation of the rib junction should be accompanied 
by tenderness in the ribcage margin, and the symptoms should respond to administration of 
moist heat and anti-inflammatories.  A patient suffering from a liver disease caused by 
excessive alcohol intake or other toxic exposure should report heavy drinking habits or 
exposure to toxic substances without taking medication, and the lab results should reveal 
elevated liver chemistries.  Finally, the possibility of a liver disease caused by hepatitis A, B, 
C or any other viral infection could be supported by a history of drug use, or by blood tests 
that reveal high enzyme levels, serum levels, or a chronic hepatitis virus.  See Lawson & 
Daniel, supra note 93, at 405.   
 116  See Pat Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making: Cognitive 
Strategies and Detection of Bias, 9 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1184, 1195, 1200 (2002) 
[hereinafter Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making]. 
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than one hypothesis is consistent with the various tests, even if none is fully 
supported.  The physician will then be called upon to make an inference to 
the best explanation in order to determine which hypothesis, if any, should 
be considered the diagnosis.  This inferential task will oftentimes be 
performed in the face of somewhat noisy and partially contradictory test 
results.117 
This model of abductive reasoning is implicit in much of the literature 
on medical reasoning.  As early as the middle of the last century, Robert 
Ledley and Lee Lusted proposed a two stage model of clinical reasoning 
involving a hypothesis-generation stage followed by a hypothesis-evaluation 
stage.118  Following Arthur Elstein and colleagues, this model came to be 
known as “hypothetico-deductive” reasoning,119 that is based on the “rapid 
generation of a small set of hypotheses to account for the patient’s problem, 
which are then tested against incoming data (e.g., further history findings or 
lab results).”120  It has been suggested that the sequence of history, physical 
exam, and lab tests are each designed to test the hypotheses that survived the 
previous step.121  This approach has also become known as the select and 
test method.122 
Special attention has been devoted at the crucial phase of generating a 
comprehensive initial set of viable hypotheses.  As explained by Pat 
Croskerry, premature diagnostic closure can result from features that present 
 
 117  For illustration, the blood tests could be positive for hepatitis C as the carrier state, but 
negative for the other viruses tested, which would make the physician inclined to infer that 
the hepatitis C carrier state is at least part of the problem. If the carrier state is the cause of 
the patient’s entire condition, however, the symptoms should have existed for a considerable 
time period.  It follows, then, that if the symptoms occurred only recently, the carrier state is 
an unlikely explanation for the entire condition.  See Lawson & Daniel, supra note 93, at 409. 
 118  See Robert S. Ledley & Lee B. Lusted, Reasoning Foundations of Medical Diagnosis, 
130 SCI. 9, 9 (1959); see also Patel et al., Thinking and Reasoning in Medicine, supra note 93, 
at 728.  
 119  See ARTHUR K. ELSTEIN ET AL., MEDICAL PROBLEM SOLVING: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CLINICAL REASONING (1978); see also Judith L. Bowen, Educational Strategies to Promote 
Clinical Diagnostic Reasoning, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2217, 2217–25 (2006).   
 120  See Vimla Patel et al., Diagnostic Reasoning and Decision Making in the Context of 
Health Information Technology, 8 REV. HUM. FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS 149, 155 (2013) 
[hereinafter Patel et al., Diagnostic Reasoning and Decision Making].  
 121  Adams et al., supra note 50, at 185 
In clinical medicine, it is axiomatic that the physician first takes a history, 
then performs a physical examination, and lastly orders laboratory tests. 
During this sequence, the physician is forming hypotheses, testing them, 
refining them and rejecting some of them. The physical examination is 
focused to confirm or refute hypotheses developed during the taking of 
the history. The laboratory tests are selected to confirm or refute 
hypotheses still under consideration at the conclusion of the physical 
examination. 
Id.  
 122  See Patel et al., Thinking and Reasoning in Medicine, supra note 93, at 730. 
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themselves vividly and thus may be convincing for a particular diagnosis, or 
by anchoring on salient features early in the presentation.123  Higgs and Jones 
point out that cognitive error in medical diagnostics is frequently caused by 
over-emphasis on findings that support an existing hypothesis and rejection 
of findings that do not support a favored hypothesis.124  Indeed, one study 
found that the most common type of medical diagnostic errors (twenty-four 
percent), was the failure to consider the correct diagnosis.125  Generating the 
list of all viable hypotheses is instrumental in that it “reduc[es] the problem 
space of possible diagnoses and enable[s] clinicians to selectively solicit and 
attend to incoming data.”126 
 
 123  Anthony E. Voytovich et al., Premature Conclusions in Diagnostic Reasoning, 60 J. 
MED. EDUC. 302 (1985); see also Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making, 
supra note 116, at 1195.  For illustration, recall the female patient who reported abdominal 
discomfort.  Assume that she arrived at the doctor’s office insisting that her problem was 
caused by gallstones.  Several of her family members had suffered from gallstones, and she 
was advised that she probably had the same problem.  That familial history could lead the 
physician to lean towards believing that gallstones were the cause of the patient’s condition.  
This belief could be further strengthened by the fact that the patient ran blood tests at the 
urgent care department a couple of days earlier and the tests showed somewhat elevated “liver 
tests” and a slightly high white blood cell count.  The strength of the physician’s conviction 
in the gallbladder hypothesis might be enough to refer the patient to a surgeon for the removal 
of the affected gallbladder.  But assume that it turns out that the gallbladder was not the true 
cause of the problem.  In hindsight, it appears that the physician might have placed too much 
weight on the family members’ medical history, and over interpreted the ambiguous results 
of the blood test.  Moreover, the physician might have felt attracted to a diagnosis that avoided 
a conflict with the adamant patient.   
 124  Joy Higgs & Mark A. Jones, Clinical Decision Making and Multiple Problem Spaces, 
in CLINICAL REASONING IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 10 (3d ed. 2008).  Studies show that 
diagnostic hypotheses can skew interpretation of clinical tests.  See Vicki R. Leblanc et al., 
Believing is Seeing: The Influence of a Diagnostic Hypothesis on the Interpretation of Clinical 
Features, 77 ACAD. MED. S67, S68 (2002); see also Jess M. Pines, Profiles in Patient Safety: 
Confirmation Bias in Emergency Medicine, 13 SOC’Y ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 90, 91–93 
(2005). 
 125  See Pat Croskerry, The Importance of Cognitive Errors in Diagnosis and Strategies to 
Minimize Them, 78 ACAD. MED. 775, 777 (2003) [hereinafter Croskerry, The Importance of 
Cognitive Errors]; Gordon D. Schiff et al., Diagnostic Error in Medicine: Analysis of 583 
Physician-Reported Errors, 169 ARCH. INT. MED. 1881, 1884 (2009); Thomas S. Wallsten, 
Physician and Medical Student Bias in Evaluating Diagnostic Information, 1 MED. DECISION 
MAKING 145, 162 (1981); see also ELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 407.  Similar 
observations have been made with respect to the use of abductive reasoning in criminal 
investigations.  See David Carson, The Abduction of Sherlock Holmes, 11 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. 
& MGMT. 193, 198–99 (2009) [hereinafter Carson, The Abduction]; Keith A. Findley & 
Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 291, 292–96 (2006); INNES, supra note 88, at 127. 
 126  Patel et al., Diagnostic Reasoning and Decision Making, supra note 120, at 155.  
Indeed, the construction of an initial set of diagnoses is a mainstay of the classic hyopothetico-
deductive method of diagnostic decision making.  DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., CLINICAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGY: A BASIC SCIENCE FOR CLINICAL MEDICINE (2d ed. 1991); Croskerry, 
Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making, supra note 116, at 1200.  As explained by 
Patel and colleagues, the process commences with “cue acquisition” by the diagnostician.  
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C. Abductive Reasoning in Death Investigation 
It should come as no surprise that abductive reasoning is the process 
routinely used also in death investigations.  In their important contribution 
to the field, Adams and Hirsch set out to dispel the widely-held 
misconception that the cause of death is always revealed by structural 
changes that are observable at the autopsy.127  In actuality, the autopsy 
findings alone provide the necessary foundation for a cause-of-death opinion 
in just a minority of death investigations.  Most examined deaths involve 
lethal mechanisms that are functional derangements that are not structurally 
demonstrable.128 
Without the ability to discern the cause of death directly and reliably 
from the morphology of the body, understanding the circumstances that led 
to the death requires collecting and analyzing a wider array of evidence 
surrounding the death.  This could include conducting sexual assault kits, 
drug tests, toxicology tests, radiological tests, the collection of special 
specimens,129 and running a variety of tests on those specimens.130 
Conceptually, abductive reasoning progresses in an iterative manner, 
but death examiners cannot afford that sequential luxury.  Autopsies must be 
performed within a short time span, to enable a prompt release of the body 
to the family.131  Moreover, there may be no second opportunity to collect 
specimens, as vital clues are bound to be destroyed and contaminated by the 
autopsy itself.132  Needless to mention, evidence collection is largely 
impossible once the body has been embalmed or buried, not to mention 
cremated.133  This temporal compression means that the process of 
hypothesis generation must transpire almost simultaneously, rather than in 
an iterative fashion.  As characterized by Adams and Hirsch, the best 
contemporary definition of a complete autopsy is an autopsy that “answers 
 
Patel et al., Thinking and Reasoning in Medicine, supra note 93, at 731.  Cue acquisition can 
come as early as the moment the physician shakes the patient’s hand.  ELSTEIN ET AL., supra 
note 119, at 402 (citing JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 12 (2007)).  
 127  Adams et al., supra note 50, at 184.  
 128  Id.  
 129  For example, various diseases such as pneumonia, meningococcemia, meningitis, 
influenza, tuberculosis, viral gastroenteritis, and food-borne illness call for the collection of 
different specimens.  These specimens could include nasopharyngeal swabs, deep tracheal 
swabs, blood cultures, lung swabs, spinal tap for cerebrospinal fluid, stool culture, and more. 
 130  For example, gram stain, bacterial culture, viral isolation, electron microscopy, and 
immunoassay.  Moreover, some tests are mutually exclusive which requires that the examiner 
choose to do one at the expense of another.   
 131  Another reason for the prompt examination is that preliminary findings can be crucial 
to the ongoing police investigations, which are often conducted under time pressure.  See 
SIMON, supra note 73, at 21. 
 132  Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 557.  
 133  Id. 
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all the anticipated later questions.”134 
Applying the abductive framework to death investigation implies a 
distinction between two categories of tasks that are involved in medical 
examinations.  Forensic pathologists are engaged in performing and 
interpreting concrete medical tests, such as histology, microbiology, 
toxicology, radiology and, of course, the autopsy itself, which has been 
described as a “battery of laboratory tests.”135  These tasks constitute discrete 
procedures conducted in relatively known and contained informational 
environments.  In that sense, these tasks bear a resemblance to the bench 
work performed across other forensic disciplines.  A second cluster of tasks 
pertains to the meta level of the investigative process.  Medical examiners 
are also responsible for the strategic management of the death investigation, 
which typically takes the form of generating the hypotheses that will be the 
subject of the abovementioned testing and evaluating those hypotheses in 
light of the results of those tests.  In this latter function, forensic pathologists 
act in a capacity akin to that of case managers.  As discussed below, this role 
dualism can constrain the feasibility of context management in death 
investigations. 
IV. CONTEXT MANAGEMENT AND DEATH INVESTIGATION 
The next two Parts of the Article address its core question, namely, 
whether and how context management can and should be applied to death 
investigations.  It should be kept in mind that context management 
intervention is predicated on its potential to improve the accuracy of the 
investigation, and that prospect is predicated, in turn, on the proposition that 
death investigations entail a degree of subjectivity and an exercise of human 
judgment. Where there is no room for judgment, the investigative conclusion 
is unlikely to be affected by any sort of background information.  A casual 
observer might be tempted to believe that medicolegal death investigation is 
driven entirely by objective scientific findings.  Indeed, in some instances, 
the results of medical testing will yield objectively clear conclusions.  In 
other situations, however, the pathological findings will be murkier: internal 
organs can be only slightly discolored, disfigured or congested, histological 
patterns can be ambiguous, and x-rays abnormalities can be blurry or faint.  
That means that forensic pathologists need to deploy their training, 
knowledge and experience in the service of exercising subjective judgment.  
The subjective nature of the task is captured by Timmermans’ account of 
disagreements between forensic pathology experts about death 
 
 134  Adams et al., supra note 50, at 185.   
 135  Id. 
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determinations.136 
A. Applying the Cost-benefit Calculus to Death Investigations 
As mentioned above, it seems abundantly clear that death investigations 
are currently performed in an environment that is rife with medical and non-
medical background information.  In most forensic disciplines, especially in 
pattern comparison fields, such information would be ruled wholly task-
irrelevant and thus would be subject to strict context management.  However 
tempting, one must be cautious of reflexively transposing that measure to the 
field of death investigation.  In this vein, it would be instructive to recap 
some of the differences between the two domains. 
Recall that pattern comparisons are performed within a narrow and 
encapsulated space and timeframe.  The informational universe is confined 
to two samples and little else.  The task is well defined in that it boils down 
to drawing a discrete conclusion about a single proposition and is subjected 
to testing by means of a singular predetermined methodology.  The task can 
be conveyed to the examiner in a single communication and rarely requires 
subsequent interactions with the investigative team.  The division of labor in 
most forensic service providers is amenable to the masking of information 
in that bench analysis and case management are naturally performed by 
different people.  Thus, it is rather convenient and virtually costless to 
withhold the information from the examiner while retaining it for the 
subsequent unmasking and for reevaluation once the examination has been 
performed and documented.  There is also no reason for bench examiners to 
be involved in any discussions or triage decisions about the case before it is 
assigned to them. 
Virtually none of these features hold true in the field of death 
investigation.  Death investigations inhabit an expansive and fluid universe 
of evidence, methodologies, and investigative routes.  Rather than examine 
a single pre-determined proposition (“did the specimens originate from the 
same source?”), death investigations require generating a swath of 
hypotheses and winnowing them down to the single correct explanation 
(“what are the plausible explanations for this death, and which is the correct 
one?”).  Death investigations often entail conducting different tests using 
different methodologies, all chosen by the examiner to fit the particular case.  
Death investigation also defies the traditional division of labor that pervades 
 
 136  See TIMMERMANS, supra note 52, at 30–31, 91–92, 121–22; see also Randy L. 
Hanzlick & Jeremy Goodin, Mind Your Manners. Part III: Individual Scenario Results and 
Discussion of the National Association of Medical Examiners Manner of Death 
Questionnaire, 1995, 18 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 228 (1997) (observing a certain 
diversity of interpretations in a study of ambiguous and relatively rare cases conducted with 
198 members of NAME). 
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other forensic disciplines, in that the forensic pathologist typically serves 
both functions of analyst and of case manager. 
The most important differences between the forensic domains revolve 
around the role, function, and disruptive potential of background 
information.  First, in pattern comparison disciplines the confines of task-
relevance are generally beyond dispute, are easily determined ex-ante, and 
apply almost uniformly to every case.  In contrast, in death investigations the 
contours of task-relevance defy ex-ante delineation and vary dramatically 
from one case to the next.  For example, in the scenarios discussed above, 
the sea currents, the failing business, and the argument on the rocks helps 
illuminate the death in the first scenario, but not to the second and third 
scenarios.  By the same token, the decedent’s state of depression and 
business dispute provides insight only in the scenario of the poisoned 
jeweler, and the condition of the circuitry of the electric drill helps to 
understand the death in the third scenario, but not in the other two.  By the 
same token, the wide variety of background information used in death 
examinations—including a history of a medical condition; a syringe found 
by the body; and the decedent’s sexual habits, mental state, and financial 
difficulties—could be deemed helpful in some cases, but wholly immaterial 
and potentially biasing in most others.  In short, there seems to be no possible 
way to determine ex-ante the relevance of all possible pieces of information 
that might be instructive for the evaluation of all possible explanations of a 
death, both contemplated and unknown. 
Second, in both domains, background information is capable of 
skewing the investigative outcome towards particular—at times, 
erroneous—conclusions.  But recall that in pattern comparison disciplines, 
information that goes beyond the specimens has virtually no forensic value.  
As discussed below, in death investigations background information can also 
serve a vital facilitative function by enabling and guiding the generation of 
hypotheses, without which evidence cannot be sought and examined.  Thus, 
nestled at the heart of the conundrum that we will soon face is the fact that 
background information can have contradictory effects on the death 
investigative task: it is potentially truth-thwarting but can also be essential 
for the performance of the task.  To obtain a better sense of these 
contradictory forces, we turn to the abovementioned cost-benefit analysis.137  
En route to that analysis, we should remind ourselves that the death 
investigative task requires performing a wide range of reasoning processes 
that can typically be clustered into the three core functions of the abductive 
process: the generation of hypotheses, the testing of hypotheses, and the 
evaluation of the hypotheses’ explanatory power.  Assessing the costs and 
 
 137  See supra Part II.C.  
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benefits of any intervention will require being mindful of those respective 
functions. 
Recall that the first prong of the cost-benefit analysis focuses on the 
likely effect of context management on the accuracy of the death 
investigation.  As mentioned, the routine reliance on a broad array of 
background information in death investigations is troubling in light of the 
information’s unknown reliability and unclear diagnosticity.  Background 
information—especially social history—will often originate from family 
members, friends, caregivers, and other people.  These sources might simply 
be wrong or, given their possible stakes in the outcome of the investigation, 
might be driven by ulterior motives.  The same applies to information 
provided by police detectives, whose work is susceptible to a host of biases 
and mistakes and who often have a stake in the investigative outcome.138  
Most ominously, some medical examiner offices confer with prosecutors 
during ongoing investigations.139  Moreover, even if accurate, background 
information might appear to be more diagnostic than it really is, which could 
lead medical examiners to draw unwarranted inferences.  By their nature, 
these types of information tend to pertain to rather common life 
circumstances—such as romantic heartbreak, trouble at work, and financial 
hardship—yet, they are used to infer highly infrequent events, such as 
homicide and suicide.  As explained below, drawing low base rate 
conclusions from high base rate predictors can readily lead to wrong 
conclusions.140  At the same time, much of the background information will 
likely be accurate and diagnostic of the conditions that led to the death.  As 
such, this information is bound to sway the investigation towards the correct 
conclusion, and withholding it will reduce the accuracy of the investigative 
conclusion. 
Thus, medical examiners are bound to be faced with a mix of accuracy-
promoting and accuracy-thwarting information, and will often be incapable 
of distinguishing between the two.  Medical examiners cannot be expected 
to have the tools, resources, expertise, or motivation to reliably expose all of 
the mistaken information.  While some errors will hopefully be caught 
through the post mortem medical tests themselves, others are bound to go 
undetected and might even lead the investigation astray.  To evaluate the 
countervailing forces, one must engage in a nuanced and informed judgment 
of the frequency of correct versus incorrect background information, the 
respective weights assigned by the examiner, and the respective inferences 
 
 138  See SIMON, supra note 73, at 17–49. 
 139  See TIMMERMANS, supra note 52, at 105, 123, 140, 164 (reporting that in office he 
observed that examiners would occasionally meet with prosecutors to discuss ongoing 
investigations and to generate a consensus about the evidence).   
 140  See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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drawn by her, all of which defy quantification.  In other words, it is difficult 
to assess whether, on balance, withholding background information will 
contribute to the accuracy of the investigation or hinder it. 
The foregoing analysis applies rather straightforwardly to the second 
function of the abductive process, namely, to the performance of the autopsy 
and the interpreting of the other medical tests.  Recall that those tasks bear a 
resemblance to bench work performed in other forensic disciplines that 
warrant context management.141  That analysis also seems to apply to the 
final phase of the abductive process, where the examiner determines which 
of the viable hypotheses, if any, has withstood the testing and offers the best 
explanation.142 
The second prong of the cost-benefit analysis concerns the effect of 
context management on investigative efficacy, that is, on the examiner’s 
ability to complete the investigation and reach a conclusive determination.  
In this regard, we focus on the first function of the abductive process of 
hypothesis generation.  Recall that without evidence one cannot reach an 
investigative conclusion, but it is plainly impossible to test every possible 
piece of evidence that might have a bearing on the case.  Consistent with the 
model of abductive reasoning, death examiners solve this quandary by way 
of generating hypotheses.  The generation of hypotheses expands the search 
and thus increases the likelihood that the true explanation will be explored, 
and it directs the examiner’s attention to the collection of the suitable 
evidence.143  This is where background information becomes essential to the 
endeavor: hypotheses cannot be generated without an inferential lead and, 
invariably, leads cannot be developed absent the good services of 
background information.  As Adams and Hirsch explain: 
A good medical examiner first considers the medical history, 
social history, and terminal circumstances and then forms 
hypotheses.  If no single hypothesis is particularly supported by 
the background information, more information is probably 
required.144 
In the absence of a well-developed set of hypotheses, the investigation 
may never get off the ground, the correct hypothesis might not be examined, 
and the correct evidence might not be sought and tested.145  In metaphoric 
 
 141  See supra Part I. 
 142  Still, as a practical matter, this issue might be moot.  Even under a context management 
regimen, by this stage of the investigation the examiner might have already become privy to 
all background information via its sequential unmasking.   
 143  See supra Part III.A; see also Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision 
Making, supra note 116, at 1200; ELSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 153.  
 144  Adams et al., supra note 50, at 185. 
 145  Moreover, in the absence of a well-developed set of hypotheses, the investigator might 
be attracted toward a superficial explanation which increases the risk of an erroneous 
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terms, background information can be said to provide the bootstraps from 
which the death examiner lifts the investigative process.  Thus, depriving 
examiners of the appropriate information could put the investigation at risk 
of being rendered incomplete or inconclusive.146 
Once again, we face a difficult tradeoff, one that could pit the first and 
second prongs of the cost-benefit analysis against each other.  Even if we 
could determine that withholding background information has a positive net 
effect on the accuracy of the information—that is, when the biasing potential 
of the information exceeds its diagnostic value—that effect might be offset 
or even overwhelmed by the negative impact on the efficacy of the 
investigation.  Again, assessing these countervailing forces in the abstract is 
virtually impossible, which leaves us in yet another difficult place. 
To complete the cost-benefit analysis, we must consider the feasibility 
of applying context management to death investigations and any logistical 
burdens that it may impose on them.  However important, improving the 
accuracy of investigations might not be justified if it is purchased at too high 
a cost.  In this regard, we must consider the extent to which context 
management imposes logistical burdens, personnel requirements, 
coordination difficulties, extra costs, and the like.147 
For one, it seems inevitable that introducing context management will 
require additional human power devoted to each investigation, a prospect 
that will undoubtedly exacerbate the already tight shortage of forensic 
pathologists.148  Recall also that context management typically takes the form 
 
conclusion.  See Lawson & Daniel, supra note 93, at 402.  Premature closure is a common 
pitfall in criminal investigations.  See David Carson, Models of Investigation, in HANDBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 407 (Tim Newburn et al. eds., 2007); NAT’L POLICING 
IMPROVEMENT AGENCY, ASS’N OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS, PRACTICE ADVICE ON CORE 
INVESTIGATIVE DOCTRINE 100 (2d ed. 2012), https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/387 
377/response/948818/attach/2/Core%20Investigative%20Doctrine%202012.pdf; Carson, 
The Abduction, supra note 125, at 198 (stating that abductive reasoning is also viewed as a 
means to reduce the possibility of case construction).  To complicate matters, it should be 
acknowledged that, while exposure to background information widens the range of 
hypotheses generated and thus protects against premature closure, it can also have the 
opposite effect of uncovering an attractive though erroneous option, thus diverting the 
investigation away from the pursuit of the correct hypotheses.  
 146  It is also worth noting that background information also serves an important role in 
the triage decision that precedes the forensic investigation itself.  In order to assume 
jurisdiction over a case, forensic pathologists “must . . . ascertain enough history and 
circumstances and may need to inspect the body to decide whether a forensic autopsy is 
indicated and to direct the forensic autopsy toward relevant case questions.”  Peterson & 
Clark, supra note 34, at 13. 
 147  As mentioned, the forensic pathology community views the practice as a hindrance on 
their ability to perform their function.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 148  See SYS. INFRASTRUCTURE COMM., SCI. WORKING GRP. ON MEDICOLEGAL DEATH 
INVESTIGATION, INCREASING THE SUPPLY OF FORENSIC PATHOLOGISTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
1 (2012), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/2018/04/24/swgmdi_increasing 
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of linear sequential unmasking, by which each hypothesis is tested separately 
before the case manager unmasks the respective background information, 
only to be repeated for the next hypothesis.  This sequential process is bound 
to increase coordination costs, especially given the abovementioned need to 
conduct the range of medical tests in short succession.149 
Medical examiners highlight the fact that imposing context 
management procedures will have a disproportionate impact on their work.  
They argue convincingly that the risk of error is highest in a narrow category 
of cases.150  This disproportionality becomes even more skewed if it is 
agreed, as suggested below, that we should be concerned most acutely with 
investigations that are headed to criminal proceedings and which present the 
death examiner with an appreciable amount of uncertainty.  This 
disproportionality throws into question the rationale for burdening of the 
entire work load of death examiners for the sake of this limited category of 
cases.  Though, on the upside, the disproportionality also opens the door to 
a potential solution, as will be discussed below. 
Herein lies the third difficult tradeoff.  Even if it is maintained that 
context management passed muster under the first two prongs of the cost-
benefit calculus—that is, withholding the information contributes more to an 
accurate conclusion than it detracts, and that net advantage is stronger than 
any constraints it imposes on investigative efficacy—we must still inquire 
whether the sum of these benefits justifies the feasibility and logistical 
constraints imposed by context management. 
B. The Conundrum 
The foregoing cost-benefit analysis leaves us facing three difficult 
tradeoffs which make for a virtually intractable and incommensurable 
conundrum.151  It may seem to the reader that this analysis did more to 
complexify than to clarify the issue; that would be a fair conclusion, and a 
very instructive one too.  The question of applying context management to 
death investigations has baffled the forensic community for good reason: 
allowing an unfettered flow of background information is likely to skew 
some investigations away from reaching accurate conclusions, but blocking 
access to that information is bound to stifle and skew other investigations, 
while also burdening the workload in all death investigations.  In sum, the 
 
_the_supply_of_forensic_pathologists_in_the_us.pdf.   
 149  See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text.   
 150  See Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 553 (“Only a relatively small proportion of deaths 
are medical examiner or coroner cases; only a very small proportion of that small proportion 
display any ambiguity; in only a very small proportion of that very small proportion is that 
ambiguity not dealt with by some policy (as with drunk driving deaths).”). 
 151  Recall also that the task defies the feasibility of an ex-ante determination of task-
relevance.  See discussion infra Part V.A.   
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issue is replete with contradictory facets, most of which defy quantification 
and assessment.  In the next Part, this Article will suggest ways that might 
get us partially out of this morass.  Before embarking on that attempt, we 
should acknowledge two features of the conundrum that make it particularly 
difficult to solve. 
First, it should be noted that to a large extent, the controversy is stirred 
primarily by one type of background information: social history.152  Recall 
that social history is used widely in death investigations and is frequently 
instrumental to the reaching of investigative conclusions.153  But relying on 
social history tends to be far removed from the scientific core of forensic 
pathology and its reliability is often difficult to ascertain.  Moreover, social 
history tends to offer a fertile basis for the spurring of conjectural 
inferences.154  In sum, the conundrum is exacerbated by the routine reliance 
of death investigations on information that can be instrumental to the 
successful completion of the investigation, but also relatively unreliable and 
of questionable diagnosticity. 
Second, to a large extent, the roots of the conundrum stem from an 
unfortunate mismatch between the dual roles that forensic pathologists play 
in the service of public health and the criminal process.  The mismatch is 
disconcerting in light of the fact that non-medical background information is 
used mostly for the purpose of making manner of death determinations, 
which lie at the heart of the public health function.  It must not be overlooked 
that manner of death determinations have no rightful place in criminal 
proceedings.  As stated above, in their public health capacity, forensic 
pathologists serve as the effective final decision maker and are free to use 
low standards of proof in reaching their decisions, whereas in the criminal 
domain the final decision making authority is vested in the jury and should 
be made using the high threshold of beyond a reasonable doubt.155 
Recall that the critical manner of death determination—classifying a 
death as a homicide—is strictly for the jury to make.  As mentioned, any 
statement by the expert that goes beyond the cause of death determination 
amounts to a violation of the province of the jury and thus should be deemed 
unconstitutional.  Such statements should be barred also because they do not 
meet the criteria for admissibility as expert testimony, and because of the 
risk that they will be double-counted by the jury.156  This results in a sad 
 
 152  See supra Part II.A. 
 153  Social history was instrumental in distinguishing among the possible conclusions in 
the abovementioned scenarios of death by drowning, cyanide poisoning, and electrocution.  
See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.   
 154  See infra notes 173–174 and accompanying text.   
 155  See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.   
 156  See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
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irony: criminal proceedings are subjected to the potential ill effects of non-
medical background information, which is used primarily to reach 
conclusions that are superfluous—if not outright inimical—to the criminal 
process. 
V. IN SEARCH OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
It is now time to attempt to seek a way out of this conundrum.  One 
might be tempted to believe that the problems could be averted by limiting 
the scope of death investigations to determinations of cause of death, which 
tend to be based more directly on medical history and death scene findings.  
Indeed, doing away with manner of death determinations would likely 
reduce the conjectural aspects of death investigation and thus increase the 
accuracy of cause of death determinations.  But at the same time, this 
measure would severely undermine the public health function of death 
investigation, and is thus bound to yield a negative net societal benefit.  
Another tempting suggestion is to separate the two death certification 
functions, so that risky background information will be withheld during the 
determination of the cause of death, and be unmasked for the manner of death 
determination.  From a practical point of view, this proposal will be difficult 
to implement.  While the death investigative function does indeed produce 
two separate determinations, the process itself does not unfold in two 
separate steps.  Rather, hypotheses are generated and tested iteratively in 
toto.  Repeating the process, once for each determination, is not only very 
costly, but is also bound to result in poor investigative findings, not least 
because one gets to conduct only one good autopsy.  Moreover, both of the 
foregoing proposed solutions will likely be received by the medical 
examination community as a severe, even debilitating, interference with their 
ability to perform their job.  This could readily result in resentment that is 
likely to compromise compliance. 
A more promising way to alleviate the conundrum is to mend the legal 
side of the equation, namely, by barring all statements concerning manner of 
death determinations from the criminal process.  Indeed, this position has 
been adopted by some courts across the U.S., as manifested, for example, by 
the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the conviction in the Tyler 
case.157  Still, there are three difficulties with this approach, which render it 
an incomplete solution.  First, it has been endorsed in only about one-half of 
American jurisdictions.  Manner of death determinations are admitted 
regularly into evidence in the other half of jurisdictions, a state of affairs that 
is lamented and decried by the legal, human factors, and forensic pathology 
 
 157  See State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 143–44 (Iowa 2015). 
SIMON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2018  2:12 PM 
296 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:255 
communities alike.158  In light of this uniformity of discontent, lawmakers 
and judges in those jurisdictions are strongly encouraged to alter this legal 
situation and purge the criminal process of all references to manner of death 
determinations.  In the same vein, it would also be helpful if forensic 
pathologists declined to testify about manner of death determinations.159  
Second, this proposition does not address cases in which the same item of 
background information influences both cause of death and manner of death 
determinations, as seen for example in the case of Baby Tyler.160  Third, the 
impact of forensic science findings on the legal system goes well beyond 
courtroom adjudication.  Even if death investigation findings are never 
exposed to the jury, they are bound to play a role in upstream decision 
making, such as by police detectives, prosecutors, and perhaps also judges.  
The solution, then, cannot be entrusted entirely with the court system.  The 
next best option is to devise a framework that focuses on the investigative 
process and seeks to provide guidance as to when and how context 
management should be applied and when it should not. 
A. The Proposed Framework: Two Dimensions of Differentiation 
The proposed framework is premised on the intersection of two, 
admittedly imperfect, dimensions of differentiation: case differentiation and 
information differentiation.  Case differentiation is intended to limit context 
management just to the most acute cases, and information differentiation is 
intended to minimize the informational restrictions within that small 
category of cases.  This framework is conceived with the objective of 
promoting accuracy in the acute cases while limiting the burden imposed on 
the profession to a minimum. 
First, recall the medical examiner community’s objection call for 
differentiating the discipline of death investigations from pattern comparison 
disciplines.161  That sensible approach ought to be taken one step further.  
Corrective measures might need to be differentiated not just between entire 
forensic fields, but also among types of cases within those fields.  The fault 
line that this Article proposes runs along the boundary between non-obvious 
cases that are forecasted to be the subject of criminal proceedings and all 
 
 158  See, e.g., Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 552. 
 159  There is reason to suspect that forensic pathologists might feel reluctant to turn down 
pressure from prosecutors to testify.  Medical examiners face pressure from law enforcement 
agencies and may face consequences for refusing to succumb.  See Melinek et al., supra note 
45, at 94.  As described by Timmermans, medical examiner offices and law enforcement 
authorities share an “organizational ecology.”  See TIMMERMANS, supra note 52, at 159, 165, 
170, 182–83, 191, 214, 253–59.   
 160  See Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 148–49. 
 161  See Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 549; Lockhart & Satya-Murti, supra note 26, at 
1537. 
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other cases.  It seems fair to say that the need for accuracy is particularly 
acute in criminal cases.  True, death determinations matter also in non-
criminal cases, whether to insurance companies, workers’ compensation 
programs, and perhaps other stakeholders.  But nowhere are the costs of an 
investigative error as high as they are in the criminal domain, whether the 
error results in a conviction of an innocent person or a guilty person who is 
escaping punishment.  Moreover, criminal law prioritizes false negatives 
over false positives,162 which means that it is more amenable to the risk of 
incomplete or inconclusive death investigations.  Finally, in most criminal 
investigations, the state has an effective monopoly on the death 
investigation, which limits the prospect of errors being detected and 
corrected by third parties.163 
The category of acute cases shrinks even further if we focus only on 
ones that present the death examiner with an appreciable amount of 
ambiguity.  In many instances, including criminal cases, the death 
determination is rather obvious from outset.  This is true, for example, when 
the decedent was found riddled with bullet holes or hanging near a verifiable 
suicide note.  Even though the death examiner is obliged to perform a 
complete autopsy and full examination in all cases, the diagnostic demands 
from these cases is minimal, as is the risk of the conclusion being skewed by 
background information.  It should be noted that the category of acute cases 
should expand to accommodate a small group of criminal cases that are 
particularly sensitive and susceptible to background information, including 
the suspicious death of a child, deaths in custody, and deaths that result from 
police-involved shootings. 
The proposed differentiation leaves us with a very small category of 
cases.  Medical examiner offices tend to accept jurisdiction in between one 
third to one half of the cases referred to them, and of that group, only about 
five percent will be determined to be criminal.164  According to one 
 
 162  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 374 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 163  One might be concerned with the effect of an erroneous conclusion on the accuracy of 
the public health statistics.  Oliver and colleagues explain, however, that the small number of 
ambiguous deaths does not bear an appreciable effect on the statistical analysis: “Thus, if 
every single case where the manner is disputed had been incorrectly determined by the 
medical examiner or coroner’s pathologist, it would be statistically irrelevant.  From the 
perspective of the purpose of manner determination, it simply does not matter whether or not 
some individual case in litigation is determined incorrectly.”  Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 
553 (emphasis in original). 
 164  See, e.g., ANDREW BAKER, HENNEPIN CTY. MED. EXAM’RS OFFICE, HENNEPIN CTY. 
MED. EXAM’R 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 11, 12 (2017), https://www.hennepin.us/-
/media/hennepinus/residents/public-safety/documents/me-annual-report-2016.pdf?la=en; 
PATTY HAYES & RICHARD HARRUFF, KING CTY. MED. EXAM’RS OFFICE, KING CTY. MED. 
EXAM’R ANNUAL REPORT 2016 11, 12 (2017), https://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/health/ 
examiner/~/media/depts/health/medical-examiner/documents/King-County-Medical-
Examiner-2016-Annual-Report.ashx; GLENN WAGNER, CTY. OF SAN DIEGO DEP’T OF THE 
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admittedly rough estimation, only about five percent of the criminal cases 
will present the examiner with an ambiguous or contestable investigation.165  
In all, the category of nonobvious criminal deaths amounts to about one in 
every 400 deaths that are subjected to medical examination.  As mentioned 
above, imposing context management on all death investigations for the sake 
of these few acute cases seems unduly burdensome.166  But this 
disproportionality can be approached from a different angle.  The upshot of 
the relative scarcity of the acute cases is that we can target context 
management to just these cases and thus impose a minimal burden on the 
overall workload of death examiners.  Given NAME’s recommendation that 
an examiner perform no more than 250 autopsies per year,167 this would 
amount to about one case in every nineteen months.  True, the cautious 
examiner will probably elect to approach more cases as potentially sensitive, 
but even such a prudent approach should not produce a case of this nature 
more frequently than once in every few months. 
Thus, it is proposed that the triage that is already conducted for 
determining jurisdiction,168 will be used also to funnel the incoming cases 
into two different treatments.  The vast majority of cases will be designated 
to be handled in the prevailing manner, that is, without any formal context 
management requirement (though, as discussed below, medical examiners 
are encouraged to engage voluntarily and privately in self-administered 
attempts to soften the possible effect of background information in all cases 
that come their way).  Cases that appear ex-ante to be criminal in nature and 
wherein the occurrence of death seems to have been brought about by 
nonobvious circumstances should be marked by a clear label, say, precaution 
alert and be designated for special treatment.  Whenever possible, the triage 
should be performed by someone other than the examiner who will be 
assigned to the case. 
But even within this category of cases, we need to be attuned to the 
efficacy of the investigative process, as limiting access to all background 
information will likely stifle a large proportion of those cases.  Hence, the 
second dimension of differentiation is between types of information that 
should be shared with death examiners and types that are best withheld from 
 
MED. EXAM’R, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 62 (2017), https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content 
/dam/sdc/me/docs/SDME%20Annual%20Report%202016.pdf. 
 165  E-mail from Andrew Baker, Former President, Nat’l Ass’n of Medical Exam’rs, to the 
author (July 26, 2018 4:33 PM) (on file with author). 
 166  See Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 558 and accompanying text.   
 167  AD HOC COMM. FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE 180-DAY STUDY, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
MEDICAL EXAM’RS, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON AMERICA’S MEDICOLEGAL OFFICE 4 (2004), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/213421.pdf. 
 168  See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.  
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them.  Recall the four-way classification of background information.169  
Medical history is typically reliable, highly relevant, and diagnostic of the 
decedent’s medical condition, both by way of pointing the forensic 
pathologist towards likely causes of death and by way of excluding non-
viable explanations.  Second, findings gleaned from the death scene will 
often be essential for grasping the basic facts about the occurrence of the 
death, whether it concerns the exact position of the body, the blood spatter, 
the rope wrapped around the decedent’s neck, the syringe, the knife, or the 
empty medicine container.  True, death scene findings can be susceptible to 
over-interpretation,170 though when made in a professional and cautious 
manner, they will tend to be reliable.  It follows that medical history and 
death scene findings will invariably promote reaching the correct 
investigative conclusion, and that these types of information should not 
normally be withheld from examiners. 
Reliance on background information becomes more complicated when 
it comes to the remaining two categories of background information.  Recall 
that the third category of social history pertains to a wide range of life 
circumstances, such as the decedent’s professional hazards, risk taking 
behavior, sexual preferences, alcohol and drug use, social circles, financial 
hardship, employment status, love life, travel history, recent intake of 
unfamiliar foods, or encounters with exotic animals.171  Death examiners 
might also incorporate the social history of other protagonists, such as family 
members, former and current lovers, roommates, business partners, nemeses, 
and the like.  As mentioned, social history will often be instrumental in 
reaching investigative conclusions,172  but it also originates from suspicious 
pedigree.  It is typically derived from sources within the decedent’s inner 
circle and who may have a stake in the investigative outcome, and it is far 
removed from the scientific core of forensic pathology.  Perhaps more than 
other types of background information, social history also lends itself more 
readily to conjectural inferences.  As suggested by Deborah Davis and 
William Follette, people tend to draw unwarranted inferences about rare 
events from commonly observed evidence, a phenomenon labeled intuitive 
profiling.173 The tendency to over-interpret the prevalence of extant 
 
 169  See supra Part II.A. 
 170  For example, the death scene could be manipulated by the perpetrator, and the death 
could have left no visible signs.  One must also be careful not to over-interpret death scene 
findings.  See Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Rethinking the Probative Value of 
Evidence: Base Rates, Intuitive Profiling, and the “Postdiction” of Behavior, 26 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 133, 137–58 (2002). 
 171  See supra Part II.A.  
 172  See Adams et al., supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 173  For example, people commonly infer that if people who murder their spouses were 
also unfaithful to them, then people who are unfaithful to their spouses are likely to murder 
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information is captured also by Kahneman and Tversky’s representative 
heuristic.174 
Similar, if not more grave, concerns apply to the fourth category of 
information from the police investigation.  Recall that information from the 
police investigation includes facts such as a suspect’s confession, a suspect’s 
criminal history, information provided by an eyewitness about the criminal 
event, an eyewitness’ identification of the suspect at a lineup, results of other 
forensic examinations, the prevailing investigative hypothesis, and the 
expected impact of the forensic examination on the investigative outcome.175  
This type of information typically lies well beyond the expertise of death 
examiners, which renders them incapable of assessing its veracity.  And, as 
articulated by the Iowa Supreme Court in the Tyler case, relying on such 
information raises a host of legal objections.176  In sum, the proposed 
differentiation suggests that forensic pathologists should have relatively 
unlimited access to the decedent’s medical history and findings from the 
death scene, but be kept temporarily blinded of the social history and 
information from the police investigation. 
B. Handling “Precaution Alert” Cases 
Cases designated as belonging to the narrow category of precaution 
alert should be approached with extra sensitivity to the prospect of error, 
particularly to the risk of being influenced by background information.  
Following are some specific suggestions for handling precaution alert cases: 
 The forensic pathologist should inform the detectives and the 
medicolegal scene investigator of the precaution alert status of the case 
and its sensitivity, the risk of error and bias, and the need for 
controlling background information. 
 All information flowing to the forensic pathologist should be funneled 
through the medicolegal scene investigator. 
 The forensic pathologist should brief the medicolegal scene 
investigator on the types of information that should be temporarily 
 
them.  This inference has an intuitive appeal that might sway an investigator or juror upon 
learning that a man suspected of killing his wife had previously been unfaithful to her.  But, 
as demonstrated by Davis and Follette, the base rate of men who are unfaithful is rather high 
(to the tune of twenty-six percent), and the rate of men who murder their wives is very low 
(to the tune of 240 per million based on an assumption of sixty years of marriage at four per 
million per year), which makes the unfaithful conduct a poor prognostic of the suspect’s 
culpability (yielding a probability of murder given unfaithful behavior = .000923).  See Davis 
& Follette, supra note 170, at 137–58.  
 174  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of 
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 430–54 (1972). 
 175  See Jeanguenat & Dror, supra note 46, at 4. 
 176  See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.  
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withheld. 
 In case of any doubt concerning the masking of information, the 
medicolegal scene investigator should seek the opinion of a death 
examiner who is not involved in the case. 
 With few exceptions, the forensic pathologist should have access to all 
available medical history and findings from the death scene. 
 With few exceptions, information pertaining to the social history of the 
decedent should be masked from the forensic pathologist. 
 With few exceptions, information pertaining to the police investigation 
should be masked from the forensic pathologist.  This type of 
information will typically include facts such as a suspect’s confession, 
a suspect’s criminal history, an eyewitness’s statements about the 
criminal event, an eyewitness’ identification of the suspect at a lineup, 
results of other forensic examinations, the detectives’ investigative 
hypotheses, and the expected impact of the forensic examination on the 
investigative outcome.177 
 Information that was masked should be conveyed to the death examiner 
upon the completion of the respective test.  At various points, the 
forensic pathologist and the medicolegal scene investigator should 
confer to ensure that the relevant information has been unmasked. 
 Throughout the investigation, the forensic pathologist should maintain 
a meticulous record of the procedure, including the exposure to and the 
masking of background information, the tests performed and their 
results, viable hypotheses under consideration and the emerging 
conclusions. 
 Police officers should not be present in the autopsy room in precaution 
alert cases, particularly in cases involving police related deaths.  Police 
detectives should make themselves available to take calls from the 
forensic pathologist for the sole purpose of responding to queries from 
the pathologist.  Detectives should also be available to receive updates 
from forensic pathologists, especially under exigent circumstances, 
such as when the autopsy results are deemed essential to protect lives 
or to help the police conduct a hot pursuit. 
 Forensic pathologists who have doubts about their judgments and 
conclusions or who feel that the background information was not 
properly managed would be encouraged to request that the testing and 
interpretation of results be performed by a peer or colleague.  
Whenever possible, the peer consultant should be blinded to the 
 
 177  For an example of an exception, one could imagine that a witness stated to the police 
that a suspect was seen approaching the death scene carrying a certain poison that would not 
normally have been included in the toxicology tests.  
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background information as well as to the death examiner’s theories, 
leanings, and investigative conclusions. 
 Precaution alert cases should be submitted for verification by a fellow 
death examiner (peer review).  Whenever possible, the peer consultant 
should be blinded to the background information as well as to the death 
examiner’s theories, leanings, and investigative conclusions. 
 Personnel participating in the death examination should be insulated 
from any request, demand, or expectation conveyed by any agency or 
stakeholder. 
 Prosecutors should never be involved in or briefed on ongoing death 
investigations and should not be permitted to communicate with death 
examination personnel on any such investigation. 
 Any pressure to provide a particular investigative conclusion should be 
rebuffed and reported. 
 Any deviation from these procedures should be documented and 
explained in the investigative report. 
 Medical examiner offices should inculcate a culture of frank scientific 
inquiry to ensure unfettered exchange of opinions in the course of peer 
consultations and peer review. 
C. Open-Mindedness and Self-Masking 
One of the obvious features of the proposed framework is that it is 
designed to be executed and administered at the local level of the medical 
examiner’s office and even of individual examiners.  The success of such a 
self-administered endeavor relies on the acceptance and internalization by 
the forensic pathology community of the potential ill-effects of exposure to 
background information.  As mentioned, some voices in the community 
express a certain skepticism towards the mere proposition that death 
investigation is susceptible to the effect of cognitive bias.178  But recall that 
cognitive bias is not the only route via which exposure to background 
information can influence investigative outcomes.  That influence can 
readily occur whenever an investigator consciously and deliberately 
incorporates background information into the decision mix, typically in the 
honest belief that it is relevant, reliable and diagnostic.  Thus, even if the 
skepticism were warranted, it would not obviate the need to introduce 
context management procedures to the field of death investigation. 
Moreover, it must be emphasized that skepticism towards the prospect 
of bias rests on shaky empirical grounds.  True, the adverse effects of 
cognitive bias have not been demonstrated experimentally in the specific 
practice of death investigation.  But that lack of research is hardly proof that 
 
 178  See, e.g., Oliver et al., supra note 25, at 556–57. 
SIMON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2018  2:12 PM 
2019] MINIMIZING ERROR AND BIAS 303 
the risk of cognitive bias is non-existent.  Rather, it is best understood as 
stemming from daunting methodological and logistic constraints that all but 
preclude any such endeavor.  Laboratory studies are bound to be hampered 
by the immense difficulty of simulating the complex environment of death 
examinations, and naturalistic studies in the real world are fraught with 
ethical and pragmatic difficulties, and undermined by the lack of access to 
the ground truth. 
It should be clear by now that the forensic pathology community’s 
resistance to a blanket imposition of context management to the field seems 
warranted.  But this agreement is based on an appreciation of the high costs 
and unclear benefits associated with such a policy.  That, however, is not the 
same as agreeing with the rejection of the prospect of cognitive pitfalls in 
this vital line of work, whether in the form of relying consciously on non-
medical background information or in the form of unconscious bias.  There 
is good reason to doubt that any professional group is immune to the errors 
and systemic biases that have been documented so consistently in scores of 
research studies conducted across vast arrays of experimental paradigms and 
tested on a wide variety of both lay179 and professional populations.180 
The forensic pathology community’s rejection of the prospect of 
cognitive bias seems odd given the open and broad acknowledgement of the 
risk of bias in medical decision making—the mother of forensic pathology.  
That frank recognition was best articulated in the monumental report To Err 
is Human: Building a Safer Health System, issued in 1999 by the Institute of 
Medicine.181  Cognitive biases have featured prominently across a variety of 
medical fields,182 notably, in the work of Jerome Groopman,183 Lucian Leape 
and colleagues,184 Mark Graber and colleagues,185 Pat Croskerry,186 and Jesse 
Pines.187  Tellingly, context bias has been demonstrated within the subfields 
 
 179  See Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better of Us, supra note 82, at 806–08; Miller, 
supra note 82, at 409. 
 180  See Charman et al., supra note 82, at 198; Fraser-Mackenzie et al., Cognitive and 
Contextual Influences, supra note 82, at 152; Kassin, The Forensic Confirmation Bias, supra 
note 82, at 43, 45–48. 
 181  INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et 
al. eds., 1999).  
 182  Penny Whiting et al., Sources of Variation and Bias in Studies of Diagnostic Accuracy: 
A Systematic Review, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 189, 189–202 (2004).  
 183  JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK (2007).  
 184  Lucian L. Leape, A Systems Analysis Approach to Medical Error, 3 J. EVALUATION 
CLINICAL PRAC., 213, 213–22 (1997); Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years 
After to Err is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2384, 2384–90 
(2005). 
 185  Mark Graber et al., Reducing Diagnostic Errors in Medicine: What’s the Goal?, 77 
ACAD. MED. 981, 981–92 (2002); Berner & Graber, infra note 187.  
 186  Croskerry, The Importance of Cognitive Errors, supra note 125.  
 187  See Pines, supra note 124. It is worth noting that the error rate in clinical diagnostic 
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of medical pathology,188 and surgical pathology and cytology.189 
Due to its unconscious nature, cognitive bias can distort investigative 
conclusions even when the death examiner is acting in an honest and 
professional manner.  It thus behooves the forensic pathology community to 
relax the unwavering trust in the conclusions of its work and consider an 
approach that is open to the prospect of self-doubt, a core principle of the 
scientific method.  Even when dealing with cases that do not fall into the 
category of precaution alert, forensic pathologists should be encouraged to 
seek feasible and creative ways to manage their exposure to background 
information in a voluntary and private fashion.  As noted in the work of 
Timmermans, while conducting an autopsy under the suspicion of a heart 
failure, some death examiners would sequence the autopsy such that the heart 
dissection (the most likely locale of organ failure) would be kept for last, as 
a means of forcing themselves to pay close attention to all other organs.190 
As a small scale example, a physician friend of the author follows three 
self-made and self-administered techniques to manage her own exposure to 
both medical and non-medical background information.  First, when 
consulted for a second opinion, she instructs patients to withhold the prior 
physician’s opinion until she has completed the exam and informed them of 
her diagnosis and treatment plan.  Second, she refrains from reading the 
patients’ home address and any other non-medical information.  Third, she 
blinds herself to all aspects of her remuneration, such as the patients’ type of 
 
decisions is hardly neglible—estimated at about fifteen percent, of which eighty percent of 
errors are attributed to physician’s thought processes (as opposed to organizational errors, 
technical errors, or patient-related errors). See Anne M. Stiggelbout et al., Medical Decision 
Making, in 2 THE WILEY BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 775, 
777 (Gideon Keren & George Wu eds., 2015); Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, 
Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S2–S23 
(2008); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized 
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370–
76 (1991); Pat Croskerry & Geoff Norman, Overconfidence in Clinical Decision Making, 121 
AM. J. MED. S24, S24–S29 (2008).  As stated by Lawson and Daniel, “It seems that doctors 
do not often stumble because of their ignorance of clinical facts.  Instead, they miss diagnoses 
because they subconsciously fall into any number of cognitive ‘traps.’”  Lawson & Daniel, 
supra note 93, at 402. 
 188  See Frederick A. Meier, The Landscape of Error in Surgical Pathology, in ERROR 
REDUCTION AND PREVENTION IN SURGICAL PATHOLOGY 3–26 (Raouf E. Nakhleh ed., 2015); 
Andrew A. Renshaw & Edwin W. Gould, Measuring Errors in Surgical Pathology in Real-
life Practice: Defining What Does and Does Not Matter, 127 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 
144, 144–52 (2007); Andrew A. Renshaw et al., Results of Multiple-Slide, Blinded Review of 
Papanicolaou Slides in the Context of Litigation: Determining What Can Be Detected 
Regularly and Reliably, 105 CANCER 263, 263–69 (2005). 
 189  See Raouf E. Nakhleh et al., Interpretive Diagnostic Error Reduction in Surgical 
Pathology and Cytology: Guideline from the College of American Pathologists Pathology 
and Laboratory Quality Center and the Association of Directors of Anatomic and Surgical 
Pathology, 140 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 29, 29–40 (2016).  
 190  See TIMMERMANS, supra note 52, at 59.  
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medical insurance or other form of payment.  As this friend explains, these 
self-blinding rules protect her from the risk of being influenced by opinions 
of other physicians, the socio-economic status of the patient, or her financial 
stake in providing the care.  Given the enormity of the impact of death 
investigations on people’s fates, it would be heartening to see greater 
openness and sensibility to such measures in the field of forensic pathology. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The question of exposure to background information in death 
investigations raises an intricate web of difficult questions and tough 
quandaries.  Failing to find a neat and hermetic solution, this Article has 
proposed an admittedly rough framework that inevitably relies on 
contestable assumptions, debatable classifications, and ex-ante judgments 
that might turn out to be mistaken.  But seeking second best solutions seems 
preferable to settling for none.  To be sure, if the framework is ever put into 
effect, it is bound to gain much from the insight and experience borne by 
reflective practice.  At a minimum, the framework will hopefully facilitate 
the ongoing conversation within the forensic science community and bring 
us closer to the elusive balance among the accuracy, efficacy and feasibility 
of death investigations. 
 
